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The global COVID-19 pandemic starkly revealed the underlying 
structural harms and produced vulnerabilities for people living in 
closed congregate settings like immigration detention centres 
(‘IDCs’) and residential aged care facilities (‘RACFs’). This article 
compares the Australian legal regimes that regulate IDCs and 
RACFs, conceptualising both as authorising and enabling sites of 
control, confinement and social isolation. We argue that specific 
COVID-19 measures have intensified a logic of social exclusion and 
disposability towards people in IDCs and RACFs. Through 
comparing recent COVID-19 litigation, the article explores the 
possibilities and limitations of engaging legal strategies to achieve 
social reform and legal accountability within both sites of 
confinement. Ultimately, we suggest that such COVID-19 litigation 
has the greatest possibility of advancing social justice when it is 
embedded in a broader politics of de-incarceration and abolition 
oriented towards political inclusion, public health and building more 
equitable and just communities.  
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
In March 2020, the Communicable Diseases Network Australia (‘CDNA’)1 
adopted two distinct sets of COVID-19 guidelines in response to the global 
pandemic: one set applicable to residential aged care facilities (‘RACFs’); and the 
other applicable to correctional and detention facilities, including custodial prisons 
and immigration detention centres (‘IDCs’).2 While the adoption of two sets of 
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1 The CDNA is a joint initiative of the National Health and Medical Research Council, and the Australian 
Health Ministers’ Advisory Council. 
2 See Communicable Diseases Network Australia, ‘CDNA National Guidelines for the Prevention, Control 
and Public Health Management of COVID-19 Outbreaks in Residential Care Facilities in Australia’ 
(Guidelines, 13 March 2020) <https://www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/07/cdna-
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guidelines implies a formal separation between different regulatory regimes, in 
substance, the guidelines bear striking similarities. Both promote an outbreak 
prevention, containment and management model, prioritising practices of 
detection, isolation and monitoring as the primary means for limiting COVID-19 
infection exposure and transmission within closed congregate settings. This model 
reflects the general regulatory response to COVID-19 across sites of confinement; 
one that largely exacerbates experiences of confinement without necessarily 
offering adequate protections to the people incarcerated in IDCs nor people living 
in RACFs.  
This article analyses Australian COVID-19 measures and legal accountability 
litigation across IDCs and RACFs as two key sites of confinement.3 From the start 
of the pandemic, experts emphasised the higher degree of vulnerability amongst 
older people and others with pre-existing medical conditions, including people 
incarcerated in IDCs.4 Additionally, and of significance to our analysis, the 
preventive, protective measures recommended by governments and medical 
experts for the general public are precisely those measures which are difficult to 
guarantee in confined, congregate settings like RACFs and IDCs. More 
disturbingly, the refusal to consider forms of accommodation or alternative care 
for those in RACFs and IDCs has enhanced the risk and likelihood of exposures, 
rather than minimised them. Accordingly, the COVID-19 global pandemic has 
amplified the pre-existing structural harms of these sites, and certain COVID-19 
 
national-guidelines-for-the-prevention-control-and-public-health-management-of-covid-19-outbreaks-in-
residential-care-facilities-in-australia.pdf> (‘COVID-19 Guidelines for RACFs’); Communicable 
Diseases Network Australia, ‘CDNA National Guidelines for the Prevention, Control and Public Health 
Management of COVID-19 Outbreaks in Correctional and Detention Facilities in Australia’ (Guidelines, 
31 March 2020) <https://www.health.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2020/06/cdna-guidelines-for-
the-prevention-control-and-public-health-management-of-covid-19-outbreaks-in-correctional-and-
detention-facilities-in-australia_1.pdf> (‘COVID-19 Guidelines for IDCs’). The CDNA is a 
subcommittee of the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (‘AHPPC’), whose terms of 
reference are to ‘provide national public health coordination and leadership and to support best practice 
for the prevention and control of communicable diseases’: ‘About Communicable Diseases Network 
Australia’, Department of Health (Web Page, 25 March 2015) 
<https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/content/cda-cdna-cdna.htm#refs>. For the 
purposes of this article, the term ‘IDCs’ includes any Alternative Places of Detention (‘APODs’) that also 
function as closed environments, such as the Mantra Bell City hotel in Melbourne and Kangaroo Point 
hotel in Brisbane. 
3  See Scott Burris et al (eds), ‘Assessing Legal Responses to COVID-19’ (Research Paper, Public Health 
Law Watch, August 2020) for an assessment of legal responses to the adverse impact of the pandemic on 
particular communities and groups. 
4  World Health Organization, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Situation Report (Report No 51, 11 
March 2020); ‘Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) Advice to National Cabinet 
on 30 March 2020’, Department of Health (Web Page, 31 March 2020) 
<https://www.health.gov.au/news/australian-health-protection-principal-committee-ahppc-advice-to-
national-cabinet-on-30-march-2020>; ‘Urgent Action Needed to Prevent COVID-19 “Rampaging 
through Places of Detention”: Bachelet’, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Web Page, 
25 March 2020) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25745&LangID=E 
&fbclid=IwAR1MrRlJ3J3LdKub1w3GUx2WXB4AIvpXZHoWbjCRRpY70EB_E_X4vZMgcvA>. 
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response measures have intensified the individual vulnerabilities of those confined 
there – vulnerabilities which are in part produced by the conditions of these sites.5  
It might seem counterintuitive to bring together an analysis of IDCs with 
RACFs. While they appear to be – and in many ways are – quite disparate legal 
regimes and populations, both sites are marked by jurisdictional, regulatory and 
conceptual similarities. These connections help us to think through possibilities 
and limits of legal advocacy strategies to disrupt structural harms reflected by the 
pandemic and beyond, especially given state resistance to categorising RACFs and 
IDCs as sites of control, confinement and structural violence. Moreover, we argue 
that COVID-19 responses reveal an underlying failure to properly acknowledge 
and care for the lives of people in RACFs and IDCs as lives worth living or as lives 
worthy of protection.6 In these sites, confinement and loss of personal autonomy 
are experienced and rationalised in different ways that exceed the conventional 
focus on prisons as the hallmark of state-sanctioned carcerality and loss of 
individual freedom. As such, focusing on legal advocacy connected to these sites 
(rather than prisons) might have broader application to a range of other regimes of 
state control, such as quarantine, disability and child welfare, and provide further 
impetus for dialogues and activism across sites. Despite these parallels, we identify 
key differences in the litigation concerning IDCs and RACFs. This suggests that, 
notwithstanding their convergences as sites of confinement and control, the 
adoption of particular litigation measures is informed by persistent differences 
between them, including different mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion not limited 
to the legal status of the two distinct populations. 
This article was written six months into Australia’s COVID-19 response, 
offering a pertinent moment to analyse the legal regimes, human effects and legal 
accountability strategies across two contexts of confinement. We focus on 
emerging strategic litigation and class actions concerning IDCs and RACFs that 
utilise duty of care legal arguments to compel either release from IDCs or to 
promote accountability and civil remedies for deaths in RACFs.7 Our analysis 
draws on cases currently on foot, relying upon party submissions and interlocutory 
orders that are not all on the public record. This allows us to make an original 
contribution to understandings of how law is being used at Australia’s six-month 
mark of the COVID-19 pandemic (‘the pandemic’) across sites of confinement. 
This article is structured in four Parts. Part II provides an overview of the legal 
regimes and political dynamics of confinement in IDCs and RACFs. In Part III, 
we argue that COVID-19 measures are underlined by a logic of disposability 
towards people detained in IDCs and confined in RACFs. Even if this logic is 
articulated differently for each group, official pandemic responses implicitly 
 
5  For a discussion of these heightened vulnerabilities, see the edited collection by Colleen M Flood et al 
(eds), Vulnerable: The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19 (University of Ottawa Press, 2020). 
6  Claire Loughnan, ‘Un-Treatment as Neglect: The Scene and the Unseen of Quiet Violence in Aged Care 
and Immigration Detention’, Incarcerations: An International Journal of Imprisonment, Detention and 
Coercive Confinement (forthcoming). 
7  Our analysis does not focus on other legal arguments that could be made to advance strategic human 
rights or promote accountability across RACFs or IDCs, such as utilising state-based human rights 
charters. This is because, in part, no such legal actions have been initiated to date, partly because IDCs do 
not fall under the definition of a state-based ‘public authority’.  
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construed both populations as lives not worthy of saving or protection. Despite 
this, emerging litigation is contesting the institutional failure to deliver adequate 
care and safety. In Part IV, we trace this legal action to identify key similarities 
and differences in advocacy approaches, with reactive class action cases 
characterising responses in RACFs, and proactive strategic litigation being 
pursued in relation to those held in IDCs. We conclude in Part V by considering 
the possibilities and limitations of these legal responses for challenging underlying 
and longstanding structural harms of confinement, and for advancing a politics of 
abolition that can counter the logic of disposability at work in both contexts of 
confinement.8 We understand an abolitionist politics to mean not merely the 
closure of specific sites. Instead, it is informed by a resistance to carceral power 
dynamics and harmful epistemologies about marginalised populations that are 
used to justify their confinement or incarceration. Such a politics emphasises 
building just and equitable communities, informed by principles of reciprocity, 
respect, dignity and relationality, instead of reliance on institutionalised forms of 
control under the guise of ‘protection’. This requires a commitment to meaningful 
alternatives to social isolation and abuse, rather than turning to institutionalised 
care to ‘resolve’ social needs and challenges. To move towards decarceration and 
abolition is to embrace a vision of social justice, systemic reform, and fair 
allocation of resources to end systems of oppression and inequality driving 
incarceration.9  
 
II   THE LEGAL REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION CENTRES AND AGED CARE FACILITIES IN 
AUSTRALIA 
While IDCs and RACFs in Australia are subject to separate legal regimes with 
distinct powers and purposes, they nonetheless share a number of common 
features. First, both sectors are subject to Commonwealth legislative regimes that 
set up overall federal administrative powers, regulatory functions and oversight 
mechanisms. As non-criminal sites of confinement and control, this sets them apart 
 
8  For select, foundational and recent texts on abolitionist politics, see Angela Y Davis, Are Prisons 
Obsolete? (Seven Stories Press, 2003); Allegra M McLeod, ‘Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice’ 
(2015) 62(5) UCLA Law Review 1156; Linda Moore, Phil Scraton and Azrini Wahidin (eds), Women’s 
Imprisonment and the Case for Abolition: Critical Reflections on Corston Ten Years On (Routledge, 
2017); Eileen Baldry, Bree Carlton and Chris Cunneen, ‘Abolitionism and the Paradox of Penal Reform 
in Australia: Indigenous Women, Colonial Patriarchy, and Co-option’ (2015) 41(3) Social Justice 168.  
9  In making an argument for abolition, we are not advocating a narrow set of measures – focused only on 
closure of IDCs and RACFs without any provision of social support and resources or broader social 
transformation – which could lead to dramatic increases in homelessness, trans-institutionalisation and 
the experience of living in an ‘open air prison’. This would merely contribute to new forms of 
abandonment, control and violence towards ‘disposable’ bodies. See Liat Ben-Moshe, ‘Dis-
epistemologies of Abolition’ (2018) 26(3) Critical Criminology 341; Liat Ben-Moshe, ‘Why Prisons Are 
Not “The New Asylums”’ (2017) 19(3) Punishment & Society 272; Maria Giannacopoulos and Claire 
Loughnan, ‘“Closure” at Manus Island and Carceral Expansion in the Open Air Prison’ (2020) 17(7) 
Globalizations 1118. For emerging abolitionist scholarship in a United States immigration prison context, 
see César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, ‘Abolishing Immigration Prisons’ (2017) 97(1) Boston 
University Law Review 245; Allison Crennen-Dunlap, ‘Abolishing the ICEberg’ [2018–19] 96 Denver 
Law Review 148. 
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from custodial prisons and juvenile ‘justice centres’ that primarily fall under the 
responsibility of state or territory jurisdiction.10 Second, there are important 
historical parallels across how these federal legislative regimes have allowed both 
sectors to operate in practice. Most notably, both legal regimes allow for the 
privatisation of services, a characteristic which emerged during the Howard 
years.11 Privatisation introduced a profit-motive in both sectors that sits 
ambivalently alongside service models supposedly offering care, welfare and 
humanitarian support. Finally, both regimes at times are justified as dedicated to 
the safety and security of those detained or residing there; yet both are marked by 
a violent loss of autonomy for individuals subject to these regimes. For example, 
in 2001, the then Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs rejected 
claims that immigration detention amounted to punishment, retorting that ‘it is not 
misery for people to be in a situation of safety and security’.12 Immigration 
detention is nonetheless experienced (intentionally) as punishment, even if its 
stated administrative purpose is for ‘manag[ing]’ unauthorised non-citizens and 
upholding the ‘integrity’ of Australia’s migration system.13 In RACFs, there is an 
expectation that residents are there to receive support and protection in the final 
stages of their life.14 In both regimes, we have seen persistent patterns of abuse 
and neglect, including through restrictive practices against those deemed a threat 
to others or to themselves. Although we acknowledge that, for some people, 
RACFs might provide a social, supportive environment (or at least the promise of 
this) and are commonly seen as a beneficial alternative to social isolation and 
family abuse, it is clear from the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and 
Safety15 (‘Royal Commission’) that there is a high incidence of violence and 
 
10  See, eg, Prisons Act 1952 (NSW); Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987 (NSW); Corrections Act 1986 
(Vic); Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic). 
11  This covers the period between 1996 and 2007, during the Prime Ministership of John Howard. 
12  ‘Ruddock Rejects Criticism’, AM (ABC Local Radio, 16 November 2001) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s418255.htm>. 
13  ‘Immigration Detention in Australia’, Australian Border Force (Web Page, 24 January 2019) 
<https://www.abf.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/border-protection/immigration-detention>. On the 
administrative nature of immigration detention, see Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government 
and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1. On experiences of Australian onshore immigration detention as 
prisons, see Michelle Peterie, ‘Deprivation, Frustration, and Trauma: Immigration Detention Centres as 
Prisons’ (2018) 37(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 279, 291–3. 
14  Greg McIntosh and Janet Phillips, ‘“Caring for the Elderly”: An Overview of Aged Care Support 
Services in Australia’, Parliament of Australia (E-Brief, 27 February 2003) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publicat
ions_Archive/archive/agedcare>. 
15  ‘Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety: Experimental Estimates of the Prevalence of 
Elder Abuse in Australian Aged Care Facilities’ (Research Paper No 17, December 2020) 1; Royal 
Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (Interim Report, 31 October 2019). See also Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Fading Away’: How Aged Care Facilities in Australia Chemically Restrain Older People 
with Dementia (Report, October 2019); Daisy Smith et al, ‘The Epidemiology of Sexual Assault of Older 
Female Nursing Home Residents, in Victoria Australia, Between 2000 and 2015’ (2019) 36 Legal 
Medicine 89. 
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neglect in RACFs. This reveals how a system rationalised on ideas of safety and 
security perversely can ‘deliver other [kinds of] violences’.16 
Nonetheless, important legal, practical and political distinctions remain 
between the two legal regimes. While immigration detention is purportedly 
administrative in nature, in practice IDCs operate much like prisons and are 
experienced as punitive settings.17 In contrast, the regulation of RACFs is focused 
on ensuring ‘service delivery’ of care through funding models aimed at facilitating 
quality of life, access and choice for older people. In practice, these largely 
privately-run (whether for profit or not for profit) secure facilities are segregated 
from society, offering limited social integration or even lack of freedom of 
mobility for residents.18 Importantly, IDCs and RACFs are sites of confinement, 
where individuals can be subjected to detention, surveillance, segregation and 
social isolation. As marginalised populations, they are often kept out of view, and 
may not be conceptualised as part of the community at large.19 Both can be places 
of trauma and suffering, characterised by systemic breaches of human rights and 
emerging from a history in Australia of quarantining and institutionalisation of 
certain populations.20  
 
A   Immigration Detention Centres 
Australia has had a policy of mandatorily detaining people classified as 
‘unlawful non-citizens’ since 1992.21 Under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the 
Migration Act’), an ‘unlawful non-citizen’ is considered to be any person in 
Australia who is not an Australian citizen and who does not hold a valid visa.22 As 
a consequence, they must be kept in IDCs until they either depart (or are 
deported) from Australia or are granted a valid visa.23 While most ‘unlawful non-
citizens’ can apply for bridging visas while they are in IDCs, asylum seekers who 
have arrived in Australia unauthorised by boat (termed ‘unauthorised maritime 
 
16  Claire Loughnan, ‘“Not the Hilton”: “Vernacular Violence” in COVID-19 Quarantine and Detention 
Hotels’ [2020] (3) Arena 39, 45 <https://arena.org.au/not-the-hilton-vernacular-violence-in-covid-19-
quarantine-and-detention-hotels/>. 
17  Joseph Pugliese, ‘The Tutelary Architecture of Immigration Detention Prisons and the Spectacle of 
“Necessary Suffering”’ (2008) 13(2) Architectural Theory Review 206, 208–10. 
18  See, eg, Linda Steele et al, ‘Human Rights and the Confinement of People Living with Dementia in Care 
Homes’ (2020) 22(1) Health and Human Rights Journal 7; Linda Steele et al, ‘Questioning Segregation 
of People Living with Dementia in Australia: An International Human Rights Approach to Care Homes’ 
(2019) 8(3) Laws 18 (‘Questioning Segregation of People Living with Dementia in Australia’). 
19  Steele et al, ‘Questioning Segregation of People Living with Dementia in Australia’ (n 18) 2. 
20  Alison Bashford and Carolyn Strange, ‘Isolation and Exclusion in the Modern World: An Introductory 
Essay’ in Alison Bashford and Carolyn Strange (eds), Isolation: Places and Practices of Exclusion 
(Routledge, 2003) 3–4, 8; Alison Bashford and Carolyn Strange, ‘Asylum-Seekers and National Histories 
of Detention’ (2002) 48(4) Australian Journal of Politics and History 509, 515–17; Amy Nethery, 
‘Separate and Invisible: A Carceral History of Australian Islands’ (2012) 6(2) Shima 85, 96. 
21  Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, ‘Immigration Detention in Australia’ (Background Note, Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of Australia, 20 March 2013) 1, 7.  
22  Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 13(1), 14. 
23  Ibid ss 189, 196(1). Under s 5, the term ‘detain’ means to ‘take into immigration detention; or keep, or 
cause to be kept, in immigration detention; and includes taking such action and using such force as are 
reasonably necessary to do so’. Under s 196(1) the Act states that detention ends when the unlawful non-
citizen is removed from Australia, deported, or granted a valid visa. 
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arrivals’ or ‘designated persons’ in the Act) cannot.24 Instead, they must wait until 
the Minister grants them a bridging visa if the Minister deems it ‘in the public 
interest to do so’.25 This power is held by the Minister personally, meaning that it 
is considered a discretionary, non-compellable power under the Migration Act and 
not subject to judicial review.26 The Migration Act states that courts are prevented 
from releasing unlawful non-citizens from IDCs.27 
The Migration Act’s definition of ‘immigration detention’ is permissively 
broad, including holding a person in an IDC established under the Act, or in a 
prison, a police station, certain vessels and ‘another place approved by the Minister 
in writing’.28 The Migration Act also provides the Minister with the power to 
‘establish’ and ‘maintain’ IDCs, including making regulations for their ‘operation 
and regulation’ and for the ‘conduct and supervision of detainees’.29 In effect, this 
enables the Minister and departmental officers ‘to determine the places at which 
and the manner in which a person in immigration detention is to be detained’.30 
Australia’s onshore immigration detention network currently consists of numerous 
closed, high-security facilities as well as so-called Alternative Places of Detention 
(‘APODs’) like suburban hotels, hospitals, psychiatric facilities, or foster care 
arrangements.31 
Since November 1997, the Commonwealth government has outsourced the 
daily operation of IDCs to private, for-profit operators. In practice, only one main 
operator has been awarded the so-called ‘onshore’ immigration detention services 
 
24  Ibid ss 46A, 5AA. 
25  Ibid s 195A; see also s 46A(2) that enables the Minister to allow an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ to 
make a valid application for a visa. ‘Immigration Detention in Australia’, Australian Border Force (Web 
Page, 11 December 2020) <https://www.abf.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/border-protection/immigration-
detention/detention-facilities>: This site lists the key facilities operating on the Australian mainland and 
does not list the Christmas Island detention centre. A recent statement regarding proposals to move those 
being detained on the mainland to Christmas Island can be found here: Australian Border Force, 
‘Statement regarding Christmas Island’ (Media Release, 4 August 2020) 
<https://newsroom.abf.gov.au/releases/statement-regarding-christmas-island>. For a history, see Anthea 
Vogl, ‘Crimmigration and Refugees: Bridging Visas, Criminal Cancellations and “Living in the 
Community” as Punishment and Deterrence’ in Peter Billings (ed), Crimmigration in Australia: Law, 
Politics, and Society (Springer, 2019) 149. For the punitive effects of bridging visas as well as a 
discussion of the various coping strategies of asylum seekers living in the community, see Caroline Fleay 
and Lisa Hartley, ‘“I Feel Like a Beggar”: Asylum Seekers Living in the Australian Community Without 
the Right to Work’ (2016) 17(4) Journal of International Migration and Integration 1031. 
26  Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 46A(7); Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), Bills Digest (Digest No 
40 of 2014–15, 23 October 2014) 19. Section 46A(7) of the Act describes the discretionary and non-
compellable nature of the Minister’s powers.  
27  Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 196(3). 
28  Ibid s 5. It also includes being restrained by certain officers of the Commonwealth including Border 
Force officials, Australian Federal Police members, or any other person authorised by the Minister for the 
purposes of the Act; and includes people covered by residence determinations under s 197AC. 
29  Ibid s 273. 
30  MZYYR v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 292 ALR 659, 662 [15] (Gordon 
J). 
31  There are presently eight main operational IDCs in Australia, including the recently-recommissioned 
Christmas Island Immigration Detention Centre some 1,500 km away from the Australian mainland (and 
2,600 km away from the nearest capital city, Perth): ‘Immigration Detention in Australia’, Australian 
Border Force (Web Page, 11 December 2020) <https://www.abf.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/border-
protection/immigration-detention/detention-facilities>. 
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contract at any given time. Since 2009, this operator has been Serco Australia Pty 
Ltd (‘Serco’), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the United Kingdom-based 
multinational ‘outsourcing’ services company, Serco Group.32 Through 
outsourcing the operation of Australia’s immigration detention network, the 
Australian government has sought to devolve certain legal obligations and 
practical matters to Serco.33 Nonetheless, Australian courts have held that the 
Commonwealth retains legal responsibility in the form of a non-delegable duty of 
care in relation to IDCs.34 At the end of June 2020, there were 1,523 people 
detained in IDCs in Australia, including in APODs.35  
 
32  See Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Cth) and Serco Australia Pty Ltd, ‘Immigration 
Detention Facilities and Detainee Services Contract’ (Contract, 10 December 2014) 
<https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/foi/files/2017/FA161000977-documents-released.pdf> (‘Detention 
Services Contract’). This contract is highly lucrative, with the current contract (2014–21) recently 
officially valued at AUD609 million. Under this arrangement, Serco is free to sub-contract additional 
‘service providers’, although certain ‘major’ arrangements require Departmental approval: at vol 1 pt 7. 
In recent years, this has seen Serco contracting with hotel chains such as Mantra hotel located in 
suburban Melbourne and Kangaroo Point hotel located in inner-city Brisbane, in order for them to be 
designated as APODs. For a history of IDC privatisation, see Sara Dehm, ‘Outsourcing, Responsibility, 
and Refugee Claim-Making in Australia’s Offshore Detention Regime’ in Siobhán McGuirk and 
Adrienne Pine (eds), Asylum for Sale: Profit and Protest in the Migration Industry (PM Press, 2020) 47, 
49–52. 
33  The ‘Detention Services Contract’ (n 32), for example, obliges Serco to ‘maintain an environment that 
supports the health and safety needs for all detainees’ and other specified persons at each facility, and 
ensure that detainees are ‘are informed of, and observe’ relevant Work Health and Safety rules at each 
facility: at vol 1 sch 2 cls 6(b), (d). The contract also anticipates the management of emergencies and 
places specific obligations on Serco in relation to such emergencies, including requiring Serco to ‘ensure 
that each Facility is a safe and secure environment for people to live and work in, and comply with all 
applicable Laws and Australian Standards for the control and management of emergencies’: at vol 1 sch 2 
s 2 cl 7(a). In addition, Serco is obliged to deliver security services at each IDC to ‘scale to accommodate 
the unique needs, risks and challenges associated with each Detainee, and the Detainee cohort as a 
whole’: at vol 1 sch 2 s 4 cl 1.1(b)(iv).  
34  See S v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 
217, 259 [205], 261–2 [213]–[217] (Finn J); SBEG v Commonwealth (2012) 208 FCR 235, 237 [7], 239 
[19] (Keane CJ, Lander and Siopis JJ). 
35  Department of Home Affairs, Commonwealth of Australia, Immigration Detention and Community 
Statistics Summary (Report, 30 June 2020). According to the Refugee Council of Australia, there were 
approximately 190 men detailed in the two main APODs in Australia in August 2020: namely, around 70 
men detained in the Mantra Hotel in Melbourne and approximately 120 men in the Kangaroo Point Hotel 
in Brisbane: Email from Sahar Okhovat to Claire Loughnan and Asher Hirsch, 27 August 2020. These 
are refugees and asylum seekers who were previously evacuated to Australia for medical treatment from 
offshore detention on Papua New Guinea and Nauru, many of whom have been detained there for 12 
months or more. Like a closed immigration detention centre environment, refugees and asylum seekers 
have no freedom of movement in APODs or in hotel detention; yet, as APODs and hotel detention sites 
are not purpose-built detention centres, they can be ‘exceptionally restrictive environments’ that lack 
sufficient open spaces for recreation. This means people detained in APODs and hotel detention may be 
effectively confined to their rooms for most of the day, with no access to cooking facilities or recreational 
areas. See for example, Australian Human Rights Commission, Risk Management in Immigration 
Detention (Report, 2019) 48–9. At the start of 2021, many of these men were abruptly released from 
immigration detention, although a small cohort of men still remain at the start of March 2021. See Rachel 
Eddie and Rachael Dexter, ‘“We Are Out Now”: More Refugees Released from Hotel Detention in 
Melbourne’, The Age (online, 21 January 2021) <https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/like-
flying-dozens-more-refugees-released-from-hotel-detention-in-melbourne-20210121-p56vr3.html>; Tom 
Stayner, ‘“They Are Human Beings”: Released Medevac Detainees Call for “Permanent” Resettlement 
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The operation of Australia’s immigration detention network is subject to 
oversight at the Federal level by, for example, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, 
Comcare, the Australian Human Rights Commission, ad hoc Senate Committees, 
and the Australian National Audit Office. The system has long attracted vocal 
criticism and opposition from those detained, civil society actors and oversight 
bodies within and beyond Australia.36 These have shown that indefinite detention 
amounts to cruel and degrading treatment under the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,37 despite the High Court characterising it as non-punitive detention.38 
A 2019 report by the Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’) found the 
increasing use of force in IDCs to have become ‘especially restrictive and 
especially harsh’, including the use of handcuffs for people to attend court or 
medical appointments.39 High rates of self-harm and despair attest to a mental 
health crisis in IDCs which has been documented in the medical research over a 
20-year period.40 This is often compounded by previous experiences of loss, 
displacement and trauma. In short, the design, operations, experiences and 
management of IDCs reflect a punitive intention which has come to be disavowed 
by law, irrespective of IDC conditions and the indefiniteness of punishment. 
 
B   Residential Aged Care Facilities 
Aged care encompasses a range of services for non-Indigenous Australians 
over the age of 65, and for Indigenous Australians aged 50 and over, who cannot 
live independently. Care can be provided either at home, or in RACFs. RACFs 
provide accommodation, ‘hotel’ style services and facilities, nursing and some 
health support in dedicated sites. RACF providers include not-for-profit, private 
 
Option for Refugees’, SBS News (online, 25 February 2021) <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/they-are-
human-beings-released-medevac-detainees-call-for-permanent-resettlement-option-for-refugees>.   
36  See, eg, Lucy Fiske, Human Rights, Refugee Protest and Immigration Detention (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016); Caroline Fleay, ‘The Limitations of Monitoring Immigration Detention in Australia’ (2015) 21(5) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 27; Lisa Millar, ‘Australia’s Asylum Seeker Policies Heavily 
Criticised at Human Rights Council Review’, ABC News (online, 10 November 2015)  
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-10/australias-asylum-policies-heavily-criticised-at-united-
nations/6926032>; Andreas Schloenhardt, ‘Deterrence, Detention and Denial: Asylum Seekers in 
Australia’ (2002) 22(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 54, 55;  
37  Opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987). 
38  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 572 [45], 577 [61] (McHugh J), 636 [263] (Hayne J), 645–6 
[291], 648 [297]–[298] (Callinan J); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v 
Al Khafaji (2004) 219 CLR 664, 678 [45] (Callinan J). 
39  See, eg, Australian Human Rights Commission, Risk Management in Immigration Detention (Report, 
2019) 29, and Australian Human Rights Commission, Use of Force in Immigration Detention (Report No 
130, 2019). 
40  See, eg, Zachary Steel and Derrick M Silove, ‘The Mental Health Implications of Detaining Asylum 
Seekers’ (2001) 175(11) Medical Journal of Australia 596, 598; Zachary Steel et al, ‘Psychiatric Status 
of Asylum Seeker Families Held for a Protracted Period in a Remote Detention Centre in Australia’ 
(2004) 28(6) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 527, 532–3; Kyli Hedrick et al, 
‘Temporal Variations in the Distribution of Self-Harm Episodes and Methods across the Australian 
Asylum Seeker Population: An Observational Study’ (2020) 17(8) PLoS Medicine e1003235.  
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and government providers.41 As at June 2019, there were 873 organisations 
delivering residential aged care services across 2,717 sites, with 41% of these 
being private providers.42 The remainder are delivered by religious and charitable 
organisations and a very small percentage (4%) by states, territories and local 
governments.43 The sector receives $13 billion in government payments.44 
Between 2017 and 2018, 7% of all Australians aged 65 or over were receiving 
support in RACFs.45 Approximately half of those in RACFs are diagnosed with 
dementia.46 
Although charitable, religious and state bodies have long provided aged care 
services, the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) heralded significant changes to funding 
arrangements and introduced an accreditation system for the sector.47 The Act 
introduced a new, privatised funding model, leading to a rapid increase in the 
number of for-profit providers. The accreditation process requires that all funded 
RACFs meet the quality standards of the Aged Care Quality and Safety 
Commission Act 2018 (Cth).48 
The federal government has responsibility for ‘regulation and policy oversight’ 
and compliance with quality standards in aged care.49 State and territory 
governments are responsible for the assessment of aged care places, through Aged 
Care Assessment Teams, and fund some services directly, though this is largely 
borne by the Commonwealth.50 The Aged Care Approvals Round is a competitive 
process in which providers apply for approval to deliver government-funded 
places. Providers are required to ensure that all care and services meet the care 
needs of residents, comply with resident care plans and meet aged care standards 
 
41  Productivity Commission (Cth), Report on Government Services 2020 (Report, 23 January 2020) 14.2 
[14.1] <https://www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/report-on-government-services/2020/community-
services/aged-care-services>. 
42  Department of Health (Cth), 2018–19 Report on the Operation of the Aged Care Act 1997 (Report, 27 
November 2019) 44–5 <https://www.gen-agedcaredata.gov.au/www_aihwgen/media/ROACA/2018-19-
ROACA.pdf>. 
43  Ibid 45. 
44  Ibid 45–6. 
45   ‘Aged Care’, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (Web Page, 11 September 2019) 
<https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/australias-welfare/aged-care>. As at 30 June 2019, the sector 
comprised 223,041 places in approved residential care – a mix of permanent and respite care – which is 
the largest component of the total aged care system: at 4, 11. 
46  Ibid 8. The most recent report by the Minister gives no indication of the numbers of those under the age 
of 65 in RACFs, although 3% of entries into residential aged care have been reported as people aged 
under 65 in RACFs: at figure 1. The greater vacancy rate in RACFs as compared to National Disability 
Insurance Scheme (‘NDIS’) Specialist Disability Accommodation means that RACFs are ‘the provider of 
last resort … to people with high physical support needs under the NDIS’: Summer Foundation, 
Submission to Royal Commission on Aged Care Quality and Safety (August 2019) 4 
<https://www.summerfoundation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Younger-People-in-Residential-
Aged-Care-web.pdf>. 
47  For an overview of the history of the Australian aged care system, see Carolyn Smith, ‘Navigating the 
Maze: An Overview of Australia’s Current Aged Care System’ (Background Paper No 1, Royal 
Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety, 25 February 2019) 
<https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/background-papers>.  
48  Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) ss 42–4. 
49  Productivity Commission (Cth) (n 41) 14.2 [14.1]. 
50  Ibid. 
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detailed in the Quality of Care Principles 2014 (Cth), and can lose funding or face 
sanctions for breaches.51 
Although the legislative framework for RACFs is centred on consumer 
‘choice’, this ‘choice’ remains highly constrained by legal and social conditions.52 
For example, the ‘choice’ by residents to enter RACFs is often (though not always) 
made by the individual and/or their family in a context of crisis – such as after a 
hospital admission – because there are only limited supports for them to remain in 
the community or they are considered victims of or at risk of violence and neglect. 
For many, notably those living with dementia or other cognitive impairment or 
psychosocial disability, decisions to move to RACFs are not made by the 
individuals themselves but are instead made by a substitute decision-maker 
pursuant to guardianship laws or informally by family members. Accordingly, 
many individuals are living in RACFs against their preferences and sometimes 
even non-consensually.53 While courts have determined that specific individuals 
have been unlawfully detained in RACFs,54 the design and operation of RACFs 
can lead to confinement of people irrespective of the legal terms on which they are 
living there, including locks and keypads on doors, locked gates, high fences, and 
separate dementia wards.55  
The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission was established in January 
2019 to provide more robust oversight of the sector. Advocacy is funded by the 
federal government through the National Aged Care Advocacy Program 
(‘NACAP’) and provided by the Older Persons Action Network (‘OPAN’).56 
Despite these mechanisms, the Royal Commission has reported significant 
failures, systemic abuse and neglect. Such revelations are not new and are typically 
associated with use of restrictive practices and the nature of the settings 
themselves. In its 2019 report on the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth), the Minister 
reported 5,233 ‘notifications of reportable assaults’ including alleged or suspected 
physical assault and unlawful sexual assault or contact, with 55 sanctions issued 
 
51  Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) ch 4; Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission Act 2008 (Cth) pt 7B. 
52  For a discussion of the problematic notion of ‘choice’ in aged care admissions, see Poland Lai, 
‘Regulation of “Care” in Long-Term-Care Homes in Ontario’ in Katie Aubrecht, Christine Kelly and 
Carla Rice (eds), The Aging-Disability Nexus (University of British Columbia Press, 2020) 145. 
53  Judy Allen and Tamara Tulich, ‘“I Want to Go Home Now”: Restraint Decisions for Dementia Patients in 
Western Australia’ (2007) 33(2) Law in Context 1–2, 7–10. 
54  See, eg, Public Advocate v C, B (2019) 133 SASR 353.  
55  See, eg, Steele et al, ‘Human Rights and the Confinement of People Living with Dementia in Care 
Homes’ (n 18); Steele et al, ‘Questioning Segregation of People Living with Dementia in Australia’ (n 
18) 6. See also Fiona McKenzie, ‘The Government Needs to Stop Illegal Detention of Older People’, The 
Age (online, 13 December 2020) <https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/the-government-needs-to-
stop-illegal-detention-of-older-people-20201213-p56n0f.html>. 
56  ‘The Australian Government funds the National Aged Care Advocacy Program (‘NACAP’) which 
provides free, confidential and independent advice to consumers, their families and carers. Since 1 July 
2017, NACAP has been delivered by a single national provider, the Older Persons Advocacy Network 
(OPAN)’. Department of Health (Cth) (n 42) 19. 
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against 36 aged care providers.57 The Royal Commission in its Interim Report on 
the current state of RACFs noted the systemic harms in the system: 
 The Royal Commission has heard compelling evidence that the system 
designed to care for older Australians is woefully inadequate. Many people 
receiving aged care services have their basic human rights denied. Their 
dignity is not respected and their identity is ignored. It most certainly is not a 
full life. It is a shocking tale of neglect.58  
Recently, based on reported experiences in a survey, the Royal Commission 
has estimated that 39.2% of RACF residents experience elder abuse (defined as 
emotional abuse, physical abuse and/or neglect; the estimate does not include 
financial abuse, social abuse and sexual abuse).59 In addition – unlike Australia – 
several state signatories to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(‘OPCAT’),60 such as New Zealand, recognise that aged care in institutional 
settings can be characterised as ‘places of detention’ in which individuals can be 
deprived of their liberty and autonomy. For these reasons, we argue that despite 
their differences, both IDCs and RACFs are sites of confinement and segregation, 
and places of structural harm for marginalised populations. 
 
III   COVID-19 MEASURES, DISPOSABILITY AND 
STRUCTURAL HARMS ACROSS SITES OF CONFINEMENT 
The pandemic has made visible the already-existing failures and limits of the 
regulatory regimes for IDCs and RACFs and has drawn attention to the underlying 
structural harms of, and produced vulnerabilities for people living in, closed, 
congregated settings. We argue that the harms of the virus are appreciable as an 
effect of the circumstances of being confined, in which a person’s vulnerability 
 
57  Ibid 82, 84. As at 30 June 2019, 25 of these were still in place: at 82. The overwhelming majority of these 
sanctions related to a failure to meet quality standards, including by St Basil’s home in Randwick and 15 
of the facilities run by the BUPA group, one of the largest providers in the sector: at 83, 95–6, 99. 
58  Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (Interim Report, 31 October 2019) vol 1, 12. These 
observations align with recognition of human rights abuses in RACFs, as emphasised by the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. ‘Many of these facilities are in fact 
segregated institutions, where staff exercise control over the person’s daily life and make decisions about 
the person’s care, including their placement in segregated locked wards, the administration of chemical 
restraints such as psychotropic drugs and the use of other physical restraints’: Catalina Devandas-Aguilar, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc A/74/186 (17 July 
2019) 12 [32].  
59  Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety, ‘Experimental Estimates of the Prevalence of 
Elder Abuse in Australian Aged Care Facilities’ (Research Paper No 17, December 2020) 1. See also 
Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (Interim Report, 31 October 2019). See also 
research by Human Rights Watch on widespread use of chemical restraint in Australian RACFs: Human 
Rights Watch (n 15). See also research on the prevalence of sexual assault in RACFs: Smith et al (n 15). 
60  Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature 18 December 2002, 2375 UNTS 237 (entered into force 22 June 
2006). See also Laura Grenfell, ‘Aged Care, Detention and OPCAT’ (2019) 25(2) Australian Journal of 
Human Rights 248; New Zealand Human Rights Commission, ‘The OPCAT and What It Can Do for 
Aged Care in New Zealand’ (2 June 2016) Tūrangawaewae <https://www.hrc.co.nz/news/opcat-and-
what-it-can-do-aged-care-new-zealand/>. 
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both now, and pre-COVID-19, is produced by the conditions of the site in which 
they reside. The initial stage of the pandemic offered an opportunity for 
governments to re-think detention, segregation and confinement towards both 
older people living in RACFs and asylum seekers or other detained non-citizens 
incarcerated in IDCs. Instead, COVID-19 measures adopted across both sites of 
confinement have intensified these produced vulnerabilities and exposed both 
populations to greater harms. Not only did these measures fail to protect people in 
IDCs and RACFs, these measures have increased, and may continue to increase, 
the likelihood of people within sites of confinement being exposed to, or 
contracting, COVID-19. Consequently, we suggest these COVID-19 measures 
reflected a broader positioning of both groups as ‘disposable’ populations. This 
position assumes that certain lives have different value, ought to be subject to less 
protection and considered less ‘grievable’ if their lives are lost.61 In this Part, we 
demonstrate how key COVID-19 measures adopted across both sites – despite 
purportedly being to ‘protect’ and care for people within each site – articulated 
such a logic of disposability towards people in IDCs and RACFs. 
This logic of disposability is articulated differently between the two sites. 
While the lives of people confined to RACFs are predominantly understood with 
reference to the family as the principal social institution that gives their life 
meaning and inclusion within society, people in IDCs are, in contrast, understood 
vis-à-vis their purported exclusion from the Australian nation.62 These 
understandings have the potential to affect public perceptions of the injustice of 
particular COVID-19 measures in sites of confinement. In RACFs, social isolation 
and institutionalisation is framed as delivering a social good to residents, through 
access to care and support within a purportedly protective, benevolent setting. In 
the latter, detention is understood as a necessary response to those who are deemed 
to lack political and legal membership, in which the people detained are effectively 
punished for their own presence in Australia as unauthorised or criminalised 
bodies. Interestingly, despite these differences, the COVID-19 measures at times 
implicitly treated both groups of people across these distinct sites of confinement 
as ‘risky’ subjects: in the case of immigration detainees, a threat to national 
security to the Australian nation; and in the case of older people, as a possible 
infection risk to the Australian public more generally and a drain on hospital 
resources.63 Such positionings are important, as they not only shape and sustain 
 
61  See Judith Butler, Precarious Lives: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Verso, 2004) 32. See also 
Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts (Polity Press, 2004); the ‘Deathscapes’ 
project for documentation of lives lost in immigration detention under Australia’s border ‘protection’ 
policy: Deathscapes (2016–20): Mapping Race and Violence in Settler States (Web Page, 2017) 
<https://www.deathscapes.org/>. For a detailed analysis of this in the context of Australia’s immigration 
detention policy, see Paul Hodge, ‘A Grievable Life? The Criminalisation and Securing of Asylum 
Seeker Bodies in the “Violent Frames” of Australia’s Operation Sovereign Borders’ (2015) 58 Geoforum 
122. 
62  See generally Nikolas Rose, ‘Government and Control’ (2000) 40(2) British Journal of Criminology 321. 
This understanding of people in IDCs persists despite the fact that many people in IDCs have Australian 
family members or strong social and economic ties to people in the Australian community. 
63  See also discussion in a Canadian context of the positioning during COVID-19 of migrants as ‘a risk’ 
rather than ‘at risk’, resulting in a focus on policing their admission at the border, rather than their health 
needs within the state: Y Y Brandon Chen, ‘Migrant Health in a Time of Pandemic: Fallacies of Us-
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legal regimes of care, control and confinement, but also determine how these 
populations and practices are understood and valued in the public imagination and 
by political leadership. 
Already in the early stages of the pandemic, both international and domestic 
public health advice emphasised the necessity of careful, targeted preventative 
measures in closed settings since being in enclosed, confined spaces generates 
vulnerability to the virus. In April 2020, the World Health Organization (‘WHO’) 
recommended that all states take steps to prevent and minimise outbreaks in ‘high-
vulnerability settings’ such as RACFs where individuals were at greater risk, both 
due to confinement and prior medical conditions.64 It also called for countries to 
prioritise COVID-19 diagnostic testing of ‘vulnerable populations who are at risk 
of developing severe disease’ in closed settings.65 Similarly, in the same month, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) called for the 
immediate release of refugees and asylum seekers from closed detention, and 
advocated enhanced hygiene and infection control measures, especially in 
crowded living conditions.66 As global COVID-19 infection rates surpassed 15 
million in late July 2020, UNHCR reiterated this call.67  
Although federal and state governments quickly adopted a range of measures 
to stem the spread of COVID-19 in the Australian community after Australia’s 
first positive case in late January,68 measures adopted across sites of confinement 
were much more limited. In the context of IDCs, the federal government has not 
only resisted any calls to release detainees, it has revealed a steadfast commitment 
to detaining people regardless of this risk.69 Similarly, in RACFs, there has been 
an apparent unwillingness to take action beyond that which is little more than the 
 
Versus-Them’ in Colleen M Flood et al (eds), Vulnerable: The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19 
(University of Ottawa Press, 2020) 407, 409. 
64  World Health Organization, COVID-19 Strategy Update (Report, 14 April 2020) 10 
<https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/covid-19-strategy-update---14-april-2020>. 
65  Ibid 9–10. 
66  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Global COVID-19 Emergency Response’ (Factsheet, 
9 April 2020) 
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/09042020_UNHCR%20Global%20COVID-
19%20Emergency%20Response.pdf>. 
67  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘UNHCR Stresses Urgent Need for States to End 
Unlawful Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, amidst COVID-19 Pandemic’ (Press Release, 24 
July 2020) <https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/press/2020/7/5f1569344/unhcr-stresses-urgent-need-
states-end-unlawful-detention-refugees-asylum.html>. 
68  Australia’s first case of COVID-19 was announced on 25 January 2020: Greg Hunt, ‘First Confirmed 
Case of Novel Coronavirus in Australia’ (Media Release, Department of Health (Cth), 25 January 2020) 
<https://www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/first-confirmed-case-of-novel-
coronavirus-in-australia>. The range of governmental measures introduced included voluntary and then 
compulsory quarantine for returning travellers; imposed travel restrictions, including within local 
neighbourhoods; and advocated the use of sanitisers in public spaces and personal protective equipment 
in hospitals and health care services. Schools were shut down, shifting to online classes and workers were 
advised to work from home wherever this was possible: See, eg, NSW Government, ‘COVID-related 
Legislation’, NSW Legislation (Web Page, 26 February 2021) 
<https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/information/covid19-legislation>. 
69  Anthea Vogl et al, ‘COVID-19 and the Relentless Harms of Australia’s Punitive Immigration Detention 
Regime’ (2021) 17(1) Crime, Media, Culture 43.  
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minimum standards set out for infection prevention and control.70 Even as the 
number of COVID-19 cases increased in RACFs and arrangements were made by 
some facilities to transport residents to hospitals, there was a reluctance by some 
RACFs, and even by the federal government, to support such transfers (commonly 
referred to as ‘decanting’).71 Instead, the preference was that residents remain in 
RACFs to be cordoned ‘into distinct sections of the home’, maintaining a 
separation between residents who tested positive, and those with negative test 
results.72 This reluctance has been a significant contributor to the number of 
COVID-19 related deaths in RACFs, in part because RACFs were ill-equipped to 
give effect to this. As of December 2020, those living in RACFs comprise one per 
cent of the Australian population, and yet 74.6 per cent of all COVID-19 deaths, 
most of these in Victoria which also has the highest rate of admissions to 
permanent RACFs.73 Notwithstanding the comorbidities endured by those in aged 
care, such a figure is alarming, especially given that some RACFs managed to 
contain the spread of the virus through attentive planning: many deaths were 
avoidable. 
Moreover, across IDCs and RACFs, COVID-19 measures have intensified 
experiences of social isolation, through implementing prohibitions on external 
visitors. In IDCs, the visitor program to detainees ceased on 24 March 2020 and 
additional steps were taken to prohibit people from delivering food, gifts, or other 
items to people in Victorian IDCs.74 This has effectively imposed social isolation 
on detainees. Further government attempts to seize mobile phones, based on the 
dubious claim by Federal Minister Alan Tudge that this will prevent access to 
 
70  For such standards, see eg Communicable Diseases Network Australia, ‘COVID-19 Guidelines for 
RACFs’ (n 2). 
71  On ‘decanting’, see, eg, Office for Aging Well (SA), COVID-19 Integrated Response Framework for the 
Management of Multiple Outbreaks in Residential Aged Care Facilities in South Australia (Guidelines, 
25 November 2020) 14–15; Sandy Cheu, ‘Hospitalising Residents with COVID under Spotlight’, 
Australian Aging Agenda (online, 13 August 2020) <https://www.australianageingagenda.com.au/covid-
19/hospitalising-covid-positive-residents-under-national-spotlight/>. 
72  The use of the term ‘decanting’ has itself been subject to criticism, since it degrades and dehumanises 
those in aged care. See, eg, the reported comments of federal Aged Care Safety and Quality 
commissioner Janet Anderson that the NSW policy of decanting was ‘intolerable and unsupportable’: 
Julie Power, ‘COVID-19 Has Exposed Australia’s Aged Care Sector’s Flaws, Royal Commission Hears’, 
The Sydney Morning Herald (online, 10 August 2020) <https://www.smh.com.au/national/covid-19-has-
exposed-australia-s-aged-care-sector-s-flaws-royal-commission-hears-20200810-p55k7p.html>. 
73  This figure was cited in the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19, Parliament of Australia, First 
Interim Report (Report, December 2020) xii 
<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportsen/024513/toc_pdf/Firstinterimreport.
pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf>. This report also found the Federal Government to be responsible for 
significant failures, leading to deaths in aged care: at xix. See also Rick Morton, ‘Covid-19 Outbreaks in 
Aged Care’, The Saturday Paper (online, 25 July 2020) 
<https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/health/2020/07/25/covid-19-outbreaks-aged-
care/159559920010154>. These figures also reflect similar statistics in other jurisdictions: see, eg, Joseph 
Ibrahim, ‘Ontario’s Long-term Care COVID-19 Commission’(2020) 15(4) Residential Aged Care 
Communiqué 12. This report also provides detailed case studies and analysis of the impact of COVID-19 
in residential aged care, in Australia and internationally. 
74  COVID-19 and the Border: Immigration Detention’, Department of Home Affairs (Web Page, 11 August 
2020) <https://web.archive.org/web/20201015071511/https://covid19.homeaffairs.gov.au/immigration-
detention>. 
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inappropriate internet sites and will ‘ensure the safety of those in immigration 
detention facilities’,75 would have further deprived people detained of their main 
form of contact with the outside world.76 Such contact is critical not only for their 
wellbeing, but also offers a crucial avenue of information about COVID-19 
protective measures in sites which are permeated by governmental secrecy. 
Detainees had forewarned the risk of infection since March 2020, reporting limited 
or no access to personal protective equipment (‘PPE’) and hand sanitiser, the 
failure of security guards to adhere to infection control guidelines, and the 
impracticality of observing social distancing in cramped living quarters and 
narrow hotel corridors.77 While there is to date no known case of a person in an 
IDC having contracted the virus, detainees continue to live with ongoing anxiety 
about the potential for infection and the institutional failure to do enough to protect 
them.78 This fear has been borne out in part, with two Serco guards testing positive 
within the initial period of Australia’s confirmed cases of COVID-19.79 Despite 
this, the Department of Home Affairs has continued to refuse to mass release 
people from IDCs. An Ombudsman investigation has confirmed that the number 
of people in IDCs actually increased during the first four months of the pandemic 
in Australia (March–July 2020), in part owing to the temporary pause on 
deportations.80  
Bans on visitors were also adopted in many RACFs.81 However, unlike the 
arrangements in IDCs, many RACF providers implemented alternative measures 
in order to maintain social contact, including ‘window’ visits, online contact and 
in some cases simply limiting visits to one person at a time. In consultation with 
 
75  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 May 2020, 3441 (Alan Tudge). 
76  See Migration Amendment (Prohibiting Items in Immigration Detention Facilities) Bill 2020 (Cth). At 
the time of writing, while this Bill passed the House of Representatives, it was unable to obtain majority 
support in the Australian Senate. 
77  Rebekah Holt and Saba Vasefi, ‘“We are Sitting Ducks for Covid 19”: Asylum Seekers Write to PM after 
Detainee Tested in Immigration Detention’, The Guardian (online, 24 March 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/mar/24/we-are-sitting-ducks-for-covid-19-asylum-
seekers-write-to-pm-after-detainee-tested-in-immigration-detention>. 
78  James Hancock, ‘Fears Not Enough Is Being Done to Protect Asylum Seekers in Melbourne Detention 
from Coronavirus’, ABC News (online, 2 August 2020) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-02/not-
enough-being-done-to-protect-asylum-seekers-from-coronavirus/12503618>. 
79  Ben Smee, Ben Doherty and Rebekah Holt, ‘Fears for Refugees after Guard at Brisbane Immigration 
Detention Centre Tests Positive for Coronavirus’, The Guardian (online, 19 March 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/mar/19/fears-for-refugees-as-guard-at-brisbane-
immigration-detention-centre-tests-positive-for-coronavirus>. In addition, a guard at Kangaroo Point 
Hotel detention site also contracted the virus, and a number of guards working at the Villawood detention 
centre had to self-isolate due to potential infection from the Sydney ‘Crossroads Hotel’ outbreak. See 
Matt Bungard and Rachel Eddie, ‘Staff Stood Down at Villawood Detention Centre due to COVID-19 
Concerns’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online, 13 July 2020) 
<https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/staff-stood-down-at-villawood-detention-centre-due-to-covid-
19-concerns-20200713-p55box.html>. 
80  Commonwealth Ombudsman, ‘Statement by the Commonwealth Ombudsman Michael Manthorpe on the 
Management of COVID-19 Risks in Immigration Detention Facilities’ (Media Release, 1 July 2020) 
81  Luke Henriques-Gomes, ‘Some Australian Aged Care Homes Go beyond Official Coronavirus Advice 
with Lockdowns’, The Guardian (online, 20 March 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/20/some-australian-aged-care-homes-go-beyond-official-
coronavirus-advice-with-lockdowns>. 
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the aged care sector, OPAN82 developed a code to ‘provide an agreed industry 
approach to ensure [RACF] residents are provided the opportunity to receive 
visitors during the COVID-19 pandemic, while minimising the risk of its 
introduction to, or spread within, a residential care home’.83 However, the practice 
of preventing visits to residents was not adopted by all RACFs since some 
providers recognised the greatest risk to infection would likely come from the 
‘back door’ (that is, the workforce) rather than from the ‘front door’ (that is, family 
and friends).84  
Reflecting this, the greatest risk posed to those in IDCs and RACFs has been 
from the workforce which rotates in and out of these sites, many of whom work at 
multiple workplaces. The evidence of staff transmission and infection in RACFs 
and IDCs points to the disturbing contradiction between having a workforce to 
maintain a supposedly impenetrable site, and the contribution of that workforce to 
the porosity of these boundaries: ironically, the threat of infection is most likely to 
come from those who are there to maintain these places as secure and 
impermeable.85 Expert advice also warned that Australia’s ‘current aged care 
workforce will not have the skills to manage COVID-19’.86 
By late July 2020, the Victorian Branch President of the Australian Medical 
Association warned that the Victorian aged care sector was ‘under [so much] 
pressure’ that it ‘will cause collapse and severe system stress’.87 This warning in 
part pointed to the systemic problem of creating conditions for, and reliance upon, 
a highly insecure and mobile workforce: 60% of the aged care sector workforce 
 
82  Older Persons Advocacy Network (‘OPAN’) is the key advocacy body funded by the Federal 
Government to represent the interests of older people and those in RACFs. 
83  See Older Persons Advocacy Network, ‘Industry Code for Visiting Residential Aged Care’ (Guidelines, 
11 May 2020) <https://opan.com.au/industry-code-finalised/>. 
84  ‘Sydney Hearing 2’ (Transcript No O/N H-1245083, Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and 
Safety, 11 August 2020) P-8553 (Stephen Judd).  
85  This concern has been emphasised by public interest and refugee advocacy organisations: see, eg, Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre, ‘Re-opening Christmas Island Is a Cruel and Ineffective Response to the 
Threat of COVID-19 in Immigration Detention’ (Media Release, 5 August 2020); ‘COVID19 Outbreak 
Imminent Due to Australian Border Force Neglect of Public Health Measures in Melbourne Detention 
Centres’, Asylum Seeker Resource Centre (Blog Post, 4 August 2020) 
<https://www.asrc.org.au/2020/08/04/covid19-outbreak-imminent-due-to-australian-border-force-
neglect-of-public-health-measures-in-melbourne-detention-centres/>. 
86  Lee-Fay Low, ‘Report: COVID-19 in Nursing Homes and Policy Responses in Australia’, LTC 
Responses to COVID-19 (Blog Post, 24 March 2020) <https://ltccovid.org/2020/03/24/report-covid-19-
in-nursing-homes-and-policy-responses-in-australia/>. For example, there was a dramatic decline of over 
40% of staff who had to self-isolate due to infection or possible infection and there were no adequate 
plans to do so. Regular reporting on measures adopted in RACFs across the globe by London School of 
Economics, and the International Long-Term Care Policy Network stated that ‘in practice, many of 
Australia’s aged care providers do not have the workforce, expertise, PPE or systems to manage an 
outbreak’: Adelina Comas-Herrera and Jose-Luis Fernandez-Plotka, ‘Summary of International Policy 
Measures to Limit Impact of COVID-19 on People Who Rely on the Long-Term Care Sector’ (Summary 
Paper, 30 March 2020) <https://ltccovid.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Summary-of-international-
policy-measures-to-limit-impact-of-COVID19-on-people-who-rely-on-the-Long-Term-Care-sector-30-
March-pm.pdf>. 
87  Melissa Davey, ‘Victoria’s Aged Care System on Verge of Collapse amid Covid-19 Surge, Doctors 
Warn’, The Guardian (online, 23 July 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2020/jul/23/victorias-aged-care-system-on-verge-of-collapse-amid-covid-19-surge-doctors-warn>. 
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are casual or part-time workers, many of whom work across a number of 
facilities.88 Similarly, Serco engages a highly casualised workforce within 
Australia’s immigration detention network, and subcontracts certain functions to 
separate firms like private security contractors. Two of the first COVID-19 related 
deaths in Australia are believed to have been caused by transmission from an 
infected staff member working in the Dorothy Henderson Aged Care Facility in 
Sydney.89  
It is clear that persons detained or confined in IDCs or RACFs are exposed to 
risk by reason of the settings they inhabit. Those who are older and/or have pre-
existing medical conditions, like those in RACFs and IDCs, are therefore doubly 
exposed to the virus through the harms they undergo as an effect of confinement. 
Effectively all (99.7%) of those living in RACFs have a pre-existing medical 
condition.90 Extensive and longstanding research also attests to compromised 
health as an effect of long-term detention of refugees and asylum seekers.91 
Together with prisons, these sites are among the most risky places to be confined 
during a pandemic. Yet, the extent of planning to limit infection, together with 
appropriate action to prevent exposure, has fallen far short of the standards enjoyed 
by the general public for minimising risk.92 What is more, in both sites, there have 
been concerns about secrecy and lack of transparency.93  
In response to criticisms, those responsible for services in RACFs and IDCs 
have defended their ‘meticulous adherence to expert health advice’ and 
commitment to strict infection control measures, in compliance with industry 
guidelines.94 Statements like these are hard to reconcile with high death rates in 
RACFs, and the evident failure of IDCs to ensure that those detained are equipped 
with what is required to meet the standards expected in the general community. 
This suggests a privileging of minimum procedural standards as a means of 
guaranteeing human rights (life, health and autonomy, for example), reducing 
COVID-19 response to a metrics of technical criteria; as a performance 
measurement or a ‘tick the box’ exercise, rather than the valuing of a person’s life 
 
88  Ibid. 
89  Kevin Nguyen and Glen Moret, ‘Third Coronavirus-Related Death in Australia after Man in His 80s Dies 
in Sydney Hospital’, ABC News (online, 8 March 2020) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-
08/coronavirus-related-death-in-sydney-hospital/12036410>. 




91  Steel and Silove (n 40) 598–9. 
92  Angeline Ferdinand, Claire Loughnan and Philomena Murray, ‘Refugees and Australia’s Double 
Standards on COVID-19’, Arena (online, 16 June 2020) <https://arena.org.au/refugees-and-australias-
double-standards-on-covid-19/>. 
93  Michelle Grattan, ‘View from the Hill: There’s No Case for Keeping Secret Any Aged Care Facility’s 
COVID Details’, The Conversation (online, 4 August 2020) <https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-
hill-theres-no-case-for-keeping-secret-any-aged-care-facilitys-covid-details-143920>. 
94  Biwa Kwan, ‘Border Force Defends Handling of Coronavirus Risk as Global Report Points Finger at 
Australia’s Asylum Seeker Treatment’, SBS News (online, 17 July 2020) 
<https://www.sbs.com.au/news/border-force-defends-handling-of-coronavirus-risk-as-global-report-
points-finger-at-australia-s-asylum-seeker-treatment>. 
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and all that this entails. Given the lack of meaningful commitment to the rights of 
those in RACFs, it is unsurprising then that Australia at one stage had the ‘second 
or third highest rate of death’ in the world in RACFs.95  
The social impacts are also severe.96 RACF resident, Merle Mitchell, gave 
evidence at the Royal Commission’s COVID-19 hearings to say that under the 
lockdown she was restricted to her room, with no view, no visits from family and 
friends, no opportunities to go out into the community, and reduced opportunities 
for allied health and personal care services, saying that: 
 I know I’m here until I die, so every morning when I wake up I think ‘Damn, 
I’ve woken up’ but I’m here until I die, so I’ve got to make the best of it and 
that’s what I try to do. Which is not to say that I’m not being cared for, but I 
am sure if you really asked most people here they would all say they would 
rather be dead rather than living here, if they’re honest, that is.97 
Likewise, people in IDCs have commented that they feel like ‘sitting ducks’ 
for COVID-19, held in ‘potential death trap[s] in which we have no option or 
means to protect ourselves’.98 Both sets of comments alert us to broader cultural 
acceptance of social isolation, segregation and confinement in both RACFs and 
IDCs, whether there is a pandemic or not. In particular, during the pandemic, there 
has been general acquiescence with the notion that people in RACFs are to be kept 
in, despite the reality that remaining in RACFs had not only been a health risk but 
also could led to avoidable deaths. Finally, both sets of comments provide the 
public with insights into the lived experiences of people in IDCs and RACFs. This 
is particularly so for RACFs as much of the media reporting during the pandemic 
on RACFs during the pandemic has been from the perspective of families rather 
than residents (thus being a missed opportunity to recognise their agency).99 
At the heart of such COVID-19 measures, we argue, is a logic of disposability 
that is used to limit people’s enjoyment of fundamental human rights (like freedom 
of mobility and access to healthcare) while also constructing both groups as risky 
and burdensome. While those in IDCs have long been framed by government and 
media in Australia as a border security risk and a burden on economic wellbeing 
 
95  Elias Visontay, ‘Hundreds of Australia’s Aged Care Residents Will Die of Covid because of Government 
Failure, Expert Warns’, The Guardian (online, 12 August 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2020/aug/12/australias-covid-aged-care-deaths-worst-disaster-that-is-still-unfolding-before-my-
eyes>.  
96  Bethany Brown and Kim Samuel, ‘Blanket Visitor Ban under COVID-19 Will Do More Harm than 
Good’, Human Rights Watch (Web Page, 8 April 2020) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/08/blanket-
visitor-ban-under-covid-19-will-do-more-harm-good>. 
97  ‘Sydney Hearing 2’ (Transcript No O/N H-1245082, Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and 
Safety, 10 August 2020) P-8409 (Merle Mitchell). See also her interview with Fran Kelly: ‘Balancing the 
Rights of Aged Care Residents with Broader Public Health Concerns’, RN Breakfast with Fran Kelly 
(ABC Radio, 12 August 2020) <https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/balancing-the-
rights-of-aged-care-residents-with-public-health/12548498>.  
98  Holt and Vasefi (n 77). 
99  As Carole Cox has commented, ‘Ageism perpetuates negative stereotypes that describe older people as 
frail with diminished status creating burdens on society, [and that] have been spread by media in many 
countries. Such attitudes and beliefs undervalue the contributions of older adults and may even impact 
access to services and supports, particularly when resources are scarce’: Carole Cox, ‘Older Adults and 
Covid 19: Social Justice, Disparities, and Social Work Practice’ (2020) 63(6–7) Journal of 
Gerontological Social Work 611, 612.  
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of citizens, the reluctance by the aged care sector to provide care commensurate 
with the preservation of life, likewise shows a regarding of certain lives as 
inevitably less worthy, together with the notion that they might pose a health risk 
to the community should they be moved to a hospital setting and be a burden on 
hospital resources.100 The reluctance to ‘decant’ RACF residents to hospitals – 
itself an offensive term which reduces people in RACFs to an object – has been 
described as a decision to minimise risk to others and to potentially alleviate the 
burden on the hospital system.101 Both groups of people are seen as separate to or 
distinct from the general population such that they require – while often being 
denied – separate COVID-19 protective measures. Yet, some of these key 
measures, rather than actually offering protection, have also intensified their social 
isolation and material risk of infection. This reveals an underlying tension between 
social commitments to the flourishing of productive bodies of the population at 
large deemed eligible for national resources and human rights and other people 
who are treated, in Bauman’s terms, as ‘human waste’ on the path to death.102  
Regardless of whether their lives are treated as less worth of protection and 
safety, such measures suggest the deaths of people in IDCs and RACFs are 
ultimately considered more socially acceptable or less grievable. Drawing on 
Judith Butler, who reflects on the grief and mourning for some lives, and not 
others, post-9/11,103 we question the acceptance of the death of some and the 
grievability of others in pandemic times.104 While those living in RACFs have 
formal political status, their lives are managed as lives which are already on the 
path to death or as the ‘socially dead’.105 The evident unwillingness by 
 
100  This reflects observations made by the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
contrasting ableism with ageism: ‘Although ageism and ableism share common roots and consequences, 
inequality in older age is not the mere result of ableist biases. Ageism – the stereotyping of, and prejudice 
and discrimination towards, older people and older age – is a distinct form of oppression that affects older 
persons, including older persons with disabilities. Older persons are often perceived as a burden, 
dependent, unproductive, undeserving or helpless. While disability is increasingly understood as a social 
construct, inequalities due to old age are predominantly seen as “natural” or “inevitable”’: Devandas-
Aguilar (n 58) 5 [7].  
101  On the decision of whether or not to transfer people from aged care to hospitals, including some benefits 
of remaining in aged care, see Jed Montayre and Richard Lindley, ‘Should All Aged-Care Residents with 
COVID-19 Be Moved to Hospital? Probably, But There Are Drawbacks Too’, The Conversation (online, 
7 August 2020) <https://theconversation.com/should-all-aged-care-residents-with-covid-19-be-moved-to-
hospital-probably-but-there-are-drawbacks-too-143826>.  
102  Bauman (n 61). 
103  Butler (n 61) 22, 29–30.  
104  Judith Butler and George Yancy, ‘Interview: Mourning is a Political Act Amid the Pandemic and Its 
Disparities (Republication)’ (2020) 17(4) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 483. 
105  On a foundational theorisation of the concept of ‘social death’, see Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social 
Death: A Comparative Study (Harvard University Press, 1982). For more contemporary iterations and 
uses of the concept, see Jana Králová, ‘What is Social Death?’ (2015) 10(3) Contemporary Social 
Science 235; E Borgstrom, ‘Social Death’ (2017) 110(1) QJM: An International Journal of Medicine 5. 
This ‘social death’ is rendered even more apparent for those in RACFs who are living with dementia: 
‘People living with dementia are profoundly dehumanised. They are positioned outside of full 
personhood by reason of social norms associated with continuity over the life-course of memory, 
cognition and personality. Given that dementia is associated with old age, social norms of youthfulness 
compound with norms of cognitive ability. When people living with dementia are perceived as failing to 
meet these norms, they are dehumanised in a very particular way: by being associated with waste and 
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governments and their agencies to deliver the same protections as those enjoyed 
in community to people in IDCs and RACFs discloses a preparedness to dispense 
with some lives in order to commit to other lives. This can be understood as an 
exercise in ‘scientific racism’ or social eugenics,106 a way of classifying lives 
which is redolent of the eugenics of colonial Australian policies. However, it has 
also been driven by the austerity practices which have intensified with the 
pandemic.107 It was clear that choices were made about whose lives to protect and 
save in the face of potentially limited medical resources to do so.108 
The lower standard of COVID-19 protection in IDCs and RACFs is 
particularly problematic, given the lethal force of the pandemic and the ‘hidden 
assumptions’ of healthcare systems in terms of who is entitled to proper treatment 
and care.109 A significant cohort of people in APODs were refugees evacuated to 
Australia from Papua New Guinea and Nauru for medical reasons, who were 
already barely getting the medical care they need, if any.110 Moreover, the 
 
death. The association between dementia and death is evident in representations of people living with 
dementia as “effectively dead” or “zombies” – inhabitants of a liminal zone between life and death. 
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Australian Journal of Human Rights (advance) 15. See also Alisa Grigorovich and Pia Kontos, ‘COVID-
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107  As noted in Colleen M Flood et al, ‘Overview of COVID-19: Old and New Vulnerabilities’ in Colleen M 
Flood et al, Vulnerable: The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19 (University of Ottawa Press, 2020) 1, 
13: ‘The pandemic is not a natural disaster or an “act of God”. The effects of COVID-19 are the result of 
choices: to tax and spend in ways that benefit some and disadvantage others; to intervene or not intervene 
in the economy when market forces prevent individuals from meeting basic needs; to regulate in 
particular ways; to view health as the product of a combination of luck and personal choices rather than 
the product of colliding social, economic, and political factors.’ 
108  This reflects a pattern seen elsewhere. As one doctor remarked in response to resource scarcity in the 
Lombardy region in Italy: ‘We have to decide who must die and whom we shall keep alive’: Lisa 
Rosenbaum, ‘Facing Covid-19 in Italy: Ethics, Logistics, and Therapeutics on the Epidemic’s Front Line’ 
(2020) 382(20) New England Journal of Medicine 1873, 1874. Research conducted amongst medical 
staff in Italy indicated that as difficult as this was, decisions had to be made about delivery of health care 
based on the likelihood of a life being saved. Inevitably, at a time of scarce resources, a person’s ‘stage of 
life’ was a key consideration: at 1875. Elsewhere, a Texas governor remarked that grandparents should be 
‘willing to risk death’ for the sake of the economy: KM Seethi, ‘A “Testing Time” for Ageing: 
Geronticide or Necropolitics?’, Countercurrents (online, 8 April 2020) 
<https://countercurrents.org/2020/04/a-testing-time-for-ageing-geronticide-or-necropolitics/>. 
109  See Hamish Robertson and Joanne Travaglia, ‘The Necropolitics of COVID-19: Will the COVID-19 
Pandemic Reshape National Healthcare Systems?’, London School of Economics (Blog Post, 18 May 
2020) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2020/05/18/the-necropolitics-of-covid-19-will-the-
covid-19-pandemic-reshape-national-healthcare-systems/>. 
110  See Michael Green, ‘Playing Games with Us: The Medevac Men Languishing in Hotel Detention’, The 
Guardian (online, 15 December 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
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Department of Home Affairs’ decision to re-open the remote Christmas Island IDC 
in the height of the pandemic and transfer anyone seen to be at particular risk of 
COVID-19 away from metropolitan IDCs located on the east coast of Australia 
shows a willingness to intensify existing practices of physical segregation and 
social isolation.111  
Finally, this logic of disposability is shown through the lack of any institutional 
responsibility to date for the failures of protection, in particular the high death rates 
in RACFs. Largely, to date, state and federal governments have declared their 
sympathy to affected individuals or surviving family members while avoiding 
legal or social responsibility.112 In this reluctance to take responsibility for those 
in IDCs or RACFs, these individuals become the uncounted, whose lives and 
whose deaths are not at the forefront of public concern. The inability of the 
Minister for Aged Care, Richard Colbeck, to readily provide the Royal 
Commission with figures on the deaths in aged care reflects a political amnesia of 
the older dead. The failure to properly remember these deaths can be seen as 
symptomatic of a prior erasure of their lives. Soon after, the comments by former 
Australian Prime Minister Abbott that the deaths of some should be accepted in 
order to open up a space for renewed economic activity reveals the furtive logic of 
casting some populations as economically ‘excessive’ or ‘redundant’.113 It is not 
simply that Abbott is rejecting the notion of saving lives at all costs, but that his 
comments target the lives of those deemed to be economically (and 
physiologically) less worthy. For those in IDCs, this disregard is shown through 
government attempts to silence and erase people in IDCs from public view, an aim 
that has been difficult to realise in the face of sustained vocal public protests 
drawing attention to the ‘active neglect’ of people in APODs in particular.114 We 
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<https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/everyone-is-sorry-no-one-is-responsible-covid-exposes-
lack-of-ministerial-accountability-20200828-p55qdt.html>. For example, the Federal Government’s 
National Guidelines on Aged Care released in March 2020 stated that the ‘primary responsibility of 
managing COVID-19 outbreaks lies with the RCF, in their responsibility for resident care and infection 
control; all RCF should have access to infection control expertise, whether in-house or not, and outbreak 
management plans in place’: Communicable Diseases Network Australia, ‘COVID-19 Guidelines for 
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113  Bauman (n 61) 5. 
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now turn to consider whether legal advocacy can challenge the structural harms 
and disposability in IDCs and RACFs laid bare during COVID-19. 
 
IV   COVID-19 LEGAL ADVOCACY ACROSS SITES OF 
CONFINEMENT 
This section traces legal advocacy in the form of strategic litigation and class 
actions in response to COVID-19 initiated by or on behalf of people in sites of 
confinement themselves. To date, legal actions across both sites of confinement 
have principally relied upon claims of negligence115 to either compel protective 
action from the executive (in the case of IDCs) or seek corporate accountability 
for COVID-related deaths and other harms from private organisations (in the case 
of RACFs). As our analysis demonstrates, a key distinction between the strategic 
litigation and class actions so far is that the RACF class actions have been largely 
reactive (initiating legal actions once COVID-related deaths have occurred) while 
the legal proceedings in the IDC context have sought to be preventive and 
proactive in focusing on removing people from IDCs in order to prevent any 
COVID-related deaths. This has several important legal implications including 
determining the possible legal remedy (that is, injunctive relief in IDCs in contrast 
to damages for mental harm in RACFs); framing legal subjects of harm (that is, 
people detained in IDCs themselves taking action in contrast in the RACF context 
to a more expansive plaintiff group including family members of deceased 
residents and RACF staff); and shaping subsequent state responses to the particular 
politics of care across both sites. 
 
A   Strategic Litigation and Class Actions: A Legal Duty to Care? 
Strategic litigation has been defined as a powerful advocacy tool which can 
advance human rights accountability.116 Although typically initiated by an 
individual plaintiff, a core aspect of strategic litigation is ‘its intention to have 
effects beyond that of the individual litigant bringing the case’.117 Accordingly, 
while some strategic litigation cases seek to set a new legal precedent, more often 
strategic litigation uses well-established legal principles as ‘tools’ to advance legal 
and extralegal outcomes for a wider affected population. These can include 
compelling a specific action that affects a class of persons in general, promoting 
disclosure or transparency from a particular institution, prompting behaviour 
change in that institution because of fears of negative publicity and/or financial 
loss, or seeking to raise public awareness with a view to law reform around a 
particular legal issue. We argue that such strategic litigation positions courts as 
 
115  We note that breach of fiduciary duty has also been raised in the RACF litigation discussed in Part IV(C), 
but for sake of comparison, this article focuses on the negligence cause of action. 
116  For a discussion of the power of strategic litigation in specific contexts, see, eg, Mónica Roa and Barbara 
Klugman, ‘Considering Strategic Litigation as an Advocacy Tool: A Case Study of the Defence of 
Reproductive Rights in Colombia’ (2014) 22(44) Reproductive Health Matters 31.  
117  Michael Ramsden and Kris Gledhill, ‘Defining Strategic Litigation’ (2019) 38(4) Civil Justice Quarterly 
407, 411.  
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key sites for considering, contesting and determining what institutional 
responsibility looks like and what the specific standard of care owed to people in 
sites of confinement entails. In the context of COVID-19 litigation, this is 
necessarily limited to the structure and doctrines of tort law, including its methods 
for determining ‘reasonable’ standard of care and any resulting remedies. 
However, as we will demonstrate, while this often embeds a particular reformist 
tendency into the resulting legal outcomes, it also opens up possibilities for 
questioning structural and social logics of sites of confinement themselves as well 
as challenging the logic of disposability identified in Part III above. 
The existence of particular duties of care towards people in IDCs and RACFs 
is well-established in Australian law. Courts have found that RACFs have an 
obligation to ensure that they have ‘in place a regime of care reasonably expected 
of a nursing home of that size and type’, including staff who exercise ‘the degree 
of care and skill expected of an ordinarily careful and competent carer of elderly 
frail people’.118 Similarly, courts have recognised that the Commonwealth’s duty 
of care to people in IDCs extends to having a reasonable regard to their health and 
safety while in detention, including providing appropriate healthcare such as 
specialised psychological and psychiatric services.119 This means that, in both 
sites, the existence of a legal duty of care is not in dispute. Rather, it is the scope 
of the particular duty of care (rather than its existence per se) that remains open to 
dispute or litigation, including a determination about the required standard of 
conduct and whether it has been breached in specific factual circumstances. 
Moreover, the foundational issue of whether certain populations should be 
differentially subjected to confinement sits outside of duty of care considerations: 
in law, the duty applies only once an individual is within the particular site of 
confinement or under a Minister’s or institution’s care. 
Despite these recognised legal duties, in practice many harms arising from 
IDCs and RACFs remain legally unaddressed. Research in the context of RACFs, 
for example, suggests a limited number of negligence matters in Australia being 
brought by residents or their families relative to the actual incidence of abuse and 
neglect in RACFs.120 Those who are older and/or disabled also face more general 
barriers to accessing justice,121 which can be compounded when living in 
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119  See Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Mastipour (2004) 
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Indigenous Affairs (2004) 219 CLR 486 was a case of alleged unlawful detention, the Court nonetheless 
recognised that the statutory regime of immigration detention does not deprive people in immigration 
detention of the ‘right to sue in tort or to pursue other causes of action generally available to citizens and 
others in the community’: at 560 [219] (Callinan J); and that ‘those who manage a detention centre … 
may be liable in tort’ if they do not comply with their duty of care: at 499 [21] (Gleeson CJ). In addition, 
McHugh, Gummow and Heydon JJ noted that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) confers ‘no immunity from 
liability in negligence for breach of a duty of care nor from the application of the general criminal law’: at 
507 [52]. 
120  Michael Barnett and Robert Hayes, ‘Not Seen and Not Heard: Protecting Elder Human Rights in Aged 
Care’ (2010) 14 University of Western Sydney Law Review 45, 72–3. 
121  See, eg, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament 
of Australia, Older People and the Law (Report, September 2007) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?
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institutional environments like RACFs.122 Similarly, the vast majority of people 
who are in, or have been in, IDCs do not initiate actions based in tort law, despite 
extensive evidence of the harmful nature of detention, particularly when subjected 
to long-term, indefinite detention.123 Where negligence claims for IDC-related 
injuries have been initiated, they largely tend to be settled out of court.124 While 
this may avoid prolonged court proceedings and legal costs, it reduces the 
possibility of institutional transparency or public attention for such cases, and the 
setting of precedent.125  
Despite this, courts remain a central site for articulating, contesting and 
advancing claims for those in IDCs and RACFs, including determining notions of 
‘reasonable’ conduct on the part of the authorities that have control over their lives, 
as we have seen in challenges to the treatment of people in ‘offshore’ detention.126 
In relation to ‘onshore’ IDCs, while courts have ordered injunctive relief that has 
compelled the Commonwealth to take particular actions, the remedy sought is 
often limited by the particular statutory regime.127 For example, in 2011, a Federal 
 
url=/laca/olderpeople/report.htm>; Australian Law Reform Commission, Elder Abuse: A National Legal 
Response (Final Report No 131, May 2017) <https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/elder-abuse-a-national-
legal-response-alrc-report-131/>; Sarah Ellison et al, ‘Access to Justice and Legal Needs: The Legal 
Needs of Older People in NSW’ (Report, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, December 
2004); Abigail Gray, Suzie Forell and Sophie Clarke, ‘Cognitive Impairment, Legal Need and Access to 
Justice’ (Paper No 10, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, March 2009). 
122  See also the context of complaints procedures and criminal justice processes, Joseph Ibrahim and David 
Ranson, ‘Neglect in Aged Care: A Role for the Justice System?’ (2019) 27(2) Journal of Law and 
Medicine 254, 258; ‘Department of Finance: Compensation for Immigration Detainees’, Australian 
Lawyers Alliance (Web Page, 5 July 2017) 
<https://www.lawyersalliance.com.au/ourwork/2017/department-of-finance----compensation-for-
immigration-detainees>. 
123  On the pervasiveness of psychiatric harms experienced in people in IDCs, especially by long-term 
detainees, and their potential claims in negligence, see Claire O’Connor, ‘Personal Injury Claims for 
Immigration Detainees’ (2013) 116 Precedent 24, 29. 
124  Helen Davidson, ‘Wilson Security Settles out of Court with Refugee Who Alleges Nauru Guard Raped 
Her’, The Guardian (online, 25 November 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2019/nov/25/wilson-security-settles-out-of-court-with-refugee-who-alleges-nauru-guard-raped-
her>.  
125  For example, between 1999 and 2012, the Australian government paid out over AUD5 million in 
compensation to former detainees who suffered physical injuries or psychological damage while in IDCs. 
This sum does not include compensation claims for unlawful detention (which amounted to AUD18 
million for the same period): Department of Finance and Deregulation (Cth), ‘Compensation Claims 
Made by Immigration Detainees between 1999 and 2011’ (Finance FOI Release No 11/75, 8 November 
2011). It is difficult to ascertain the precise details of these cases as many successful compensation cases 
have been settled out of court. More recently, in the 2016–17 financial year, the Australian government 
paid around $60,000 in personal injury claim management arising out of immigration detention cases: see 
Department of Finance (Cth), ‘Department of Immigration Act of Grace Payments for 2016–17 Financial 
Year’ (Finance FOI Release No 17/83, 11 July 2017). In contrast, the dispersed nature of RACF 
providers makes it difficult to know exactly how many negligence claims have been brought against the 
industry in Australia as a whole (despite the extent of reported incidents of assault in RACFs recorded in 
the Minister’s annual reports, as discussed in Part II). 
126  See Anna Talbot and George Newhouse, ‘Strategic Litigation, Offshore Detention and the Medevac Bill’ 
(2019) 13 Court of Conscience 85; Gabrielle Holly, ‘Challenges to Australia’s Offshore Detention 
Regime and the Limits of Strategic Tort Litigation’ (2020) 21(3) German Law Review 549; Dehm (n 32). 
127  See also earlier case of S v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 217, 271 [262], 273 [169] where Finn J held that he would have granted 
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Court judge ordered the Commonwealth to ‘use its best endeavours’ to place an 
unaccompanied child (who had been found to be a refugee, yet remained in 
immigration detention after being issued an adverse Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation assessment) in ‘a form of immigration detention in 
Melbourne in the State of Victoria which provides a supportive residential or 
family-based environment’.128 Yet, in the subsequent case of MZYYR the Federal 
Court dismissed an application for interlocutory injunction to compel the 
Commonwealth to place a Kurdish man in an alternate form of detention to the 
Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation (‘MITA’) which would provide 
him with ‘adequate … treatment to meet his mental health needs’. This decision 
was reasoned on the basis that the man appeared ‘more settled’ at MITA than under 
previous detention arrangements and the judge was ‘reluctant to change the status 
quo in the absence of an identified facility with appropriate and available medical 
treatment’.129 Despite this, Gordon J was prepared to order the Commonwealth to 
provide ‘appropriate medical services’ to the man at MITA in order to restrain a 
continuing tort, stating in obiter remarks that ‘[t]he Commonwealth is in a position 
of control. Detainees cannot reasonably be expected to safeguard themselves from 
danger, especially detainees with mental health needs which are known to the 
Commonwealth’.130  
As a result, while the courts provided certain forms of injunctive relief around 
the provision of healthcare in IDCs, these have been quite limited in practice and 
mindful of the statutory scheme of mandatory detention.131 In contrast, injunctive 
relief has not been routinely used to date to stop continuing or apprehended 
breaches of duty of care in RACFs. In what follows, we outline and evaluate key 
litigation across both RACFs and IDCs that has been initiated in the context of and 
in response to the pandemic. 
 
 
injunctive relief ordering the Commonwealth to transfer two asylum seekers from immigration detention 
to an Adelaide mental health facility had the Commonwealth not already transferred the men there. See 
discussion in Bernadette McSherry and Azadeh Dastyari, ‘Providing Mental Health Services and 
Psychiatric Care to Immigration Detainees: What Tort Law Requires’ (2007) 14(2) Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 260. 
128  A Child (by his next friend, Arthur) v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Citizenship [No 2] 
[2011] FCA 1519 (Mansfield J). 
129  MZYYR v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 292 ALR 659, 660–1 [4], 667 
[31], 671 [53] (Gordon J). Nonetheless, the case set an important principle that the Commonwealth has a 
duty of care to people in immigration detention to ‘provide the person with the level of medical care 
which is reasonably designed to meet their health care needs, including psychiatric care’: at 663 [20]. 
130  Ibid 671–2 [55]–[56] (Gordon J). 
131  See also Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Mastipour 
(2004) 259 FCR 576, 594 [141], 595 [144] (The Court) where the Full Federal Court, on appeal, issued 
an interlocutory order restraining the Commonwealth from detaining an Iranian man at Baxter IDC and 
from removing him to Port Hedland IDC (revising an earlier FCA order that had instructed the 
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order was ‘inappropriate’ and did not ‘give the Secretary the flexibility to move Mr Mastipour if that is 
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B    Immigration Detention Litigation during COVID-19 
Since the start of the pandemic, there have been two noteworthy negligence 
cases brought by human rights advocates to challenge the government’s refusal to 
release people from IDCs as a COVID-19 measure. One case, Plaintiff M37/2020 
v Commonwealth (‘Plaintiff M37/2020’), was initiated in late April 2020 by the 
Human Rights Law Centre on behalf of a man detained at a Brisbane IDC, but 
subsequently discontinued in mid-May due to the lack of COVID-19 community 
transmission in Queensland at the time.132 The other, BNL20 v Minister for Home 
Affairs (‘BNL20’), was initiated shortly prior to Plaintiff M37/2020 on behalf of a 
man detained at MITA but was heard subsequently. 
In Plaintiff M37/2020, the plaintiff was a man with a series of pre-existing 
medical conditions that made him particularly at risk of severe illness or death if 
he contracted COVID-19.133 He had been found to be a refugee under Australia’s 
offshore detention regime and transferred to the Australian mainland for medical 
treatment from Manus Island in early 2019. The case was brought against both the 
Commonwealth and the Minister of Home Affairs, with the main argument being 
that both respondents owed a duty to take reasonable care for the ‘safety and to 
prevent foreseeable injury’ to people detained in IDCs.134 While the existence of 
this duty was not in contention, what was disputed was the particular scope of the 
respondents’ duty and what specific steps the respondents were required to take in 
the context of COVID-19 to care for people detained in IDCs. The plaintiff argued 
that, given the respondents largely controlled the conditions in IDCs, such a duty 
of care obliged them to take reasonable steps to prevent the plaintiff from 
contracting COVID-19 and to enable the plaintiff to heed government guidelines 
on protective measures against COVID-19.135 Specifically, the plaintiff submitted 
that the particularities of IDCs meant that it was ‘highly likely’ that COVID-19 
could spread quickly if it entered the Brisbane facility.136 Accordingly, the nature 
of IDCs meant that the plaintiff was unable to take reasonable steps to protect 
himself, nor was he able to adhere to government social distancing directives. 
Additionally, the plaintiff argued that placing him in solitary confinement would 
 
132  Plaintiff M37/2020, ‘Statement of Claim’, Submission in Plaintiff M37/2020 v Commonwealth, 
VID272/2020, 1 May 2020. The case was initially filed in the High Court and was remitted to the Federal 
Court for determination at the request of the plaintiff. 
133  The man’s pre-existing medical conditions included asthma, a heart condition and diabetes: ‘Legal 
Challenge Filed to Protect Refugee at COVID-19 Risk in Immigration Detention’, Human Rights Law 
Centre (Media Release, 22 April 2020) <https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/2020/4/21/legal-challenge-
refugee-at-covid-19-risk>. 
134  Plaintiff M37/2020, ‘Statement of Claim’, Submission in Plaintiff M37/2020 v Commonwealth, 
VID272/2020, 1 May 2020, [23].  
135  The case also included an additional argument in relation to the Commonwealth’s obligations under 
occupier’s liability duty. 
136  These specific conditions included the ‘difficulty or impossibility of avoiding overcrowding’ within the 
facility (in particular in meal areas); the frequent movement and rotation of staff within the facility; the 
delay in accessing medical services; the inconsistent use by staff of PPE within the IDC; and the use of 
shared bedroom, bathroom and other facilities (including the inability ‘to control or restrict who enters 
his bedroom, bathroom and common area that he uses’): Plaintiff M37/2020, ‘Statement of Claim’, 
Submission in Plaintiff M37/2020 v Commonwealth, VID272/2020, 1 May 2020, [15]–[16]. 
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not only fail to reduce the risk of contracting COVID-19, it would cause him 
serious harm.137 
The plaintiff’s advocates framed the litigation as a regrettable but necessary 
measure to compel the respondents to heed their own COVID-19 public health 
guidelines as well as the advice of medical experts.138 The main legal outcome 
sought was an order restraining the Commonwealth from continuing to breach its 
duty of care to the plaintiff by detaining him in circumstances where he is unable 
to adhere to the government COVID-19 advice nor able to practice proper hygiene 
and social distancing. Specifically, the plaintiff emphasised that the relief sought 
was confined to ensuring the Commonwealth would discharge its duty of care and 
would extend ‘no further than necessary to ameliorate the present and continuing 
harm’ to the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff contended that such an order could 
be ‘effected by the respondents consistently with the statutory obligation to detain 
which obtains under the Act’.139 This meant that, while the case was framed in a 
way that was cognisant of the courts’ limits in relation to ordering a release from 
IDCs, the implication of such an order was to prompt release into community 
detention.  
In defence, the respondents argued that the scope of their duty needed to be 
consistent with the mandatory detention scheme under the Migration Act, and that 
it was legally unreasonable for them to adopt the additional precautionary measure 
of release into community detention given the low probability that the plaintiff 
would suffer harm if such precautions were not taken; the high burden on the 
respondents involved with taking such precautions; the ‘social utility’ of 
immigration detention;140 and the limited ‘financial and other resources’ available 
to the respondents for the purpose of immigration detention.141 It is here that the 
logic of disposability appears to structure the government’s response to people in 
IDCs: ‘protective’ action was framed as being too burdensome and expensive, 
even though, for instance, the economic cost of detaining a person in an IDC is far 
 
137  Ibid 11 [22]. 
138  For example, David Manne (Refugee Legal) stated that: ‘The Government has the opportunity to heed the 
expert medical advice by ensuring people are released into safe accommodation. If the Government does 
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‘Legal Challenge Filed to Protect Refugee at COVID-19 Risk in Immigration Detention’, Human Rights 
Law Centre (Media Release, 22 April 2020) <https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/2020/4/21/legal-challenge-
refugee-at-covid-19-risk>. 
139  Plaintiff M37/2020 ‘Submissions’, Submission in Plaintiff M37/2020 v Commonwealth, VID 272/2020, 
24 April 2020, [14]. 
140  Judicial consideration of the ‘social utility’ of a risk-creating activity is a well-established principle 
within the negligence calculus to determine generally the standard of care of a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position. See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 9(2)(d) in the context of Plaintiff M37/2020 
v Commonwealth. For select judicial discussions of the concept of ‘social utility’, see Wilson v Nilepac 
Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 63, [126]–[130] (Tobias JA); Southern Properties (WA) Pty Ltd v Executive 
Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management (2012) 42 WAR 287, 336 (Pullin 
JA); Roo Roofing Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2019] VSC 331 [426], [782] (Dixon J); Carvalho v Town 
(2020) 91 MVR 155, 173 [102] (Mossop J). 
141  Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Defence’, Submission in Plaintiff M37/2020 v Commonwealth, VID 
272/2020, 8 May 2020, [25]. 
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more costly than allowing a person to live in the community.142 Ultimately though, 
by the time that the case was heard in early May 2020, COVID-19 community 
transmission rates in Queensland had dropped so low that the claim’s prospect of 
success had lessened and the parties agreed to discontinue the case, subject to an 
earlier interim order remaining on foot until mid-June 2020.143  
The other case, in contrast, has been marginally more successful in terms of 
legal outcomes, but in practice has not fundamentally challenged the punitive logic 
or practice of immigration detention. Like the discontinued Plaintiff M37/2020, 
BNL20 rested upon a duty of care argument that also asserts that the Minister must 
‘take reasonable steps to protect’ the applicant from foreseeable COVID-19 related 
risks of harm while in IDCs.144 The applicant in BNL20 was a 68-year-old refugee 
who had been detained in MITA since late 2019 and was also diabetic. The 
applicant had arrived in Australia 10 years earlier, and was living with his family 
in the community until his visa was cancelled on allegations of him having 
provided financial assistance to people smuggling operations nearly 15 years prior. 
The applicant’s sex, age and medical condition placed him within recognised 
groups of people who were at a ‘substantially increased risk of death’ if they 
contracted COVID-19.145 
Yet unlike Plaintiff M37/2020, the applicant in BNL20 was able to obtain a 
court order restraining the Minister from detaining him in MITA from early 
August onwards.146 The application for interlocutory relief in BNL20 was also 
based on the fact of COVID-19 community transmission, including that COVID-
19 was ‘spreading rapidly within the Victorian community’.147 What made BNL20 
distinct from Plaintiff M37/2020 was that the application for the order was heard 
and granted against a background of rising infection rates in Victoria in early 
August, enabling the applicant to rely upon expert evidence that group custodial 
settings like MITA were unsafe for people at high risk of COVID-19.148 The court 
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144  BNL20, ‘Statement of Claim’, Submission in BNL20 v Minister for Home Affairs, VID239/2020, 8 April 
2020, [8]. 
145  Ibid [19]. 
146  BNL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1180 (Murphy J). The Federal Court also ordered the 
Minister to inform the applicant’s lawyers about the steps or proposed steps that they took or would take 
to comply with the order. 
147  BNL20, ‘Statement of Claim’, Submission in BNL20 v Minister for Home Affairs, VID239/2020, 8 April 
2020, [18]. 
148  ‘Federal Court Orders Minister to Stop Detaining Elderly Man at Melbourne Detention Centre Due to 
COVID-19 Risk to His Life’, Asylum Seeker Resource Centre (Blog Post, 10 August 2020) 
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order heralded a significant victory compelling the Commonwealth to act to 
protect people in IDCs from risks of COVID-19. It indicated a judicial willingness 
to assess the potential harms posed by immigration detention to particular 
individuals as well as to scrutinise the specific conditions of a person’s detention, 
and to issue judicial orders to prevent a tort from occurring. It also attracted 
considerable public attention to the failures and hypocrisy of the federal 
government’s COVID-19 response.149 As the applicant’s solicitor, Sanmati 
Verma, stated on the day of the court granting interlocutory relief, the court’s 
decision ‘makes it clear the Commonwealth is unable to ensure the safety of 
vulnerable people such as our client in detention’.150 
Yet, while the granting of interlocutory relief in BNL20 was certainly 
significant, the government’s subsequent actions demonstrate their refusal to 
concede any authority to the courts to compel releases from immigration detention. 
Rather than releasing the applicant into community detention, where he would 
have been able to return to live with his family, the Minister opted on transferring 
the plaintiff to a different IDC in Western Australia, Yongah Hill IDC, over 3,000 
km away from the applicant’s family in Melbourne. A subsequent application to 
the Federal Court to prevent his removal failed.151 Given that there were very low 
COVID-19 infections in Western Australia, the key legal argument open to the 
applicant to prevent the transfer was that transferring the applicant was too risky, 
exposing him to the possibility of becoming infected with COVID-19 during 
transfer. In response, the respondents’ counsel argued that it was theoretically 
possible for the respondents to comply with the court order by transporting the 
refugee in solitary confinement by truck to Western Australia or by ‘build[ing] an 
entire new detention centre for one person to stay in’.152 The respondents’ counsel 
also confirmed in court that the Minister had no intention of releasing the applicant 
into community detention, even though the Minister had not been personally 
briefed on the applicant’s case.153 Such legal outcomes demonstrate the limits of 
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153  As the applicant’s lawyer subsequently stated: ‘It beggars belief that the government would fly a sick, 
elderly man thousands of kilometres from his family home in Melbourne. The Commonwealth’s response 
to the health crisis in the detention network has been haphazard and dangerous, for detainees, staff and 
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Family to Perth Immigration Detention following COVID-19 Court Ruling’, Human Rights Law Centre 
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detention, exacerbated through a governmental callousness towards people 
detained in IDCs. Although BNL20 remains on foot at the time of writing, the 
Minister’s response to the interlocutory order has affirmed and intensified the logic 
of exclusion and incarceration vis-à-vis refugees and other criminalised non-
citizens.  
There are three significant aspects of these cases that offer potential 
possibilities for and limitations to advancing legal accountability. The first aspect 
is the insistence on situating people in IDCs within a general public health response 
– thus demanding equality of treatment between those in detention and those in the 
general community. A key argument in the litigation rested upon the capacity of 
those in IDCs to be able to follow Commonwealth government-issued COVID-19 
public health advice around practicing personal hygiene and social distancing. 
Both statements of claim argued that Commonwealth government-issued COVID-
19 public health advice applied to people in IDCs, drawing on medical evidence 
to do so. Yet, the respondents disputed this claim, instead opting to emphasise a 
distinction between people in IDCs and the public in general. For example, in their 
Plaintiff M37/2020 defence, the respondents argued that Commonwealth advice 
recommending good personal hygiene practices and practising social distancing 
were ‘particularised communications … directed at the public generally and not 
directed specifically at persons detained in immigration detention centres’.154 This 
articulates a broader structural tendency both in law and in certain public health 
responses to treat asylum-seeker and refugee populations as ‘separate, distant and 
disconnected from the host communities’ in which they live.155 Nonetheless, the 
litigation opened the possibility to contest such practices of exclusion and 
segregation, mobilising public discourse to insist on characterising people in IDCs 
as members of a larger ‘public’ that ought to be equally protected as part of the 
COVID-19 public health response. This broadens ideas of ‘public’ inclusion, and 
refuses the legal categories which enforce a distinction between people as either 
citizens or non-citizens.156  
Second, the cases significantly sought to reconfigure legal relations of care, 
responsibility and accountability between the Australian government and people 
incarcerated in IDCs. In focusing their legal claims primarily on the 
Commonwealth, both cases did not specifically include the private company 
running the IDC, Serco, as a formal respondent. Nonetheless, the plaintiff’s case 
was formulated so as to also cover their conduct as agents of the Commonwealth 
under the direction and control of both respondents. In contrast, the respondents’ 
defence stressed Serco as an independent entity contracted to deliver certain 
 
154  Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Defence’, Submission in Plaintiff M37/2020 v Commonwealth, VID 
272/2020, 8 May 2020, [12]. 
155  Natalie J Grove and Anthony B Zwi, ‘Our Health and Theirs: Forced Migration, Othering, and Public 
Health’ (2006) 62(8) Social Science and Medicine 1931, 1931. 
156  Instead, it emphasises an idea of the ‘public’ as the actually-existing population within a state’s territory. 
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different to the people as ‘demos’ as the foundational concept of democratic theory (which is premised on 
a logic of inclusion/exclusion): see Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Verso, 2000). 
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services, which is merely ‘subject to such direction and control by the 
Commonwealth as is lawfully permitted under the terms of their engagement’.157 
Under the Detention Services Contract, Serco already formally acknowledges that 
it has a duty of care towards detainees that sits alongside and is not modified by 
any duty of care owed by the Department.158 While the initial interim order in 
Plaintiff M37/2020, for example, did order that respondents ensure that the 
applicant was provided with PPE and accommodated in a single room,159 it did not 
explicitly name Serco as an entity subject to this formal obligation and did not 
compel Serco to take more general preventative actions including properly 
screening its employees to avoid them bringing COVID-19 infections into IDCs 
or providing PPE to all staff, contractors and detainees. Accordingly, such 
litigation can lead to a disjuncture between how legal relations of responsibility 
are framed and enforced, and the practicality of everyday IDC operations including 
how people in IDCs experience their incarceration and who is exercising control 
over their lives. 
Third, while the appeal to medical expertise allowed for framing and 
substantiating the foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff, both cases relied upon 
a factual background of increasing or high level of COVID-19 community 
infections or transmission. Indeed, the Plaintiff M37/2020 statement of claim lists 
‘existing community transmission’ as one of several factors that make it 
‘extremely likely’ that COVID-19 infections will enter the Brisbane immigration 
detention facility.160 Likewise, the applicant’s arguments in BNL20 rested upon 
that COVID-19 ‘will enter MITA once there is widespread community 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2’.161 Such arguments necessarily ‘exceptionalise’ the 
particular standard of care required by the Commonwealth/Minister as confined to 
times of health emergencies like pandemics. In the case of Plaintiff M37/2020, this 
meant that the case was discontinued once Queensland infections had significantly 
reduced, while in the BNL20 case, this has meant that the Minister was able to 
deem Western Australia a viable alternative immigration detention location. 
Ironically, it suggests the effectiveness of such litigation strategies is more likely 
should there be high COVID-19 community transmission across all Australia. 
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C   Aged Care Litigation during COVID-19 
In the RACF context, emerging litigation is taking the form of class actions 
principally for the psychological impacts on family members of the death or injury 
of residents. Again, to date, there are two noteworthy cases on foot against two 
RACF providers with aged care facilities (‘ACFs’) located in Victoria (Epping 
Gardens ACF) and NSW (St Basil’s ACF). 
In mid-August 2020, some family members of Epping Gardens ACF residents 
commenced a class action against Heritage Care Pty Ltd through Carbone 
Lawyers.162 The group on whose behalf the class action was commenced is defined 
in the writ as consisting of four categories: (a) persons who had a close proximate 
relationship to a resident who was killed, injured or put in danger by the acts or 
omissions of RACF providers during the pandemic (eg close family members); (b) 
residents who sustained injury, mental or nervous shock, loss and damage and/or 
were put in danger by acts or omissions of RACF providers during the pandemic; 
(c) legal representatives of a deceased resident who was killed, injured or put in 
danger by the acts or omissions of the defendant during the pandemic; and (d) all 
employees who worked at Epping Gardens during the pandemic and sustained 
physical injury, mental or nervous shock in connection with that employment 
and/or were put in danger by acts or omissions of the defendant.163 
The representative member in the class action is Sebastian Agnello. His 90-
year-old mother was a resident at Epping Gardens ACF who died from contracting 
COVID-19. The writ identifies 26 grounds for breach of duty of care, primarily 
focused on infection control and compliance, but also extending to concealing 
information from the plaintiff about the deceased and concealing information from 
the plaintiff and government authorities concerning the broader COVID-19 
risks.164 The Statement of Claim sought damages and punitive damages for 
negligence giving rise to nervous shock.165 The claim for punitive damages is on 
the basis of the particularly serious nature of conduct giving rise to breach.166 
Within a week of filing the Epping Gardens writ, a subsequent class action was 
commenced by Carbone Lawyers in relation to St Basil’s ACF.167 The 
 
162  Cameron Houston et al, ‘Aged Care Homes Face Threat of Legal Action Amid Negligence Claims’, The 
Age (online, 6 August 2020) <https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/aged-care-homes-face-threat-
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Submission in Agnello v Heritage Care Pty Ltd, S ECI 2020 03282, 14 August 2020. 
163  See, eg, Sebastian Agnello, ‘Statement of Claim’, Submission in Agnello v Heritage Care Pty Ltd, S ECI 
2020 03282, 14 August 2020, 3–4 [3]. 
164  Ibid 6–8 [18]. 
165  Ibid 10. 
166  The Statement of Claim states that ‘at all times material the defendant knew, that by reason of its 
conduct, it was putting the deceased at risk of death or serious injury and that nevertheless in wanton and 
contumelious disregard of the deceased and her health the defendant chose to knowingly continue to 
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167  Efstathia Fotiadis, ‘Writ’, Submission in Fotiadis v St Basil’s Homes for the Aged in Victoria, S ECI 
2020 03339, 20 August 2020. See also Josh Taylor, ‘St Basil’s Faces Class Action Suit for Allegedly 
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representative plaintiff is Efstathia (‘Effie’) Fotiadis. Her father, Dimitrios 
Fotiadis, was a 79-year-old resident of the RACF who died of COVID-19. The 
writ is similar in terms to the Epping Gardens class action: similar categories in 
the class action group, bases for duty of care and breach of duty of care, and similar 
focus on damages for mental harm. Shine Lawyers has also announced that they 
are investigating two possible class action in relation to COVID-19 deaths at 
Cumberland Manor ACF and Newmarch House ACF.168 In the media release 
regarding Newmarch House, Shine Lawyers stated that they will ‘allege the aged 
care provider was negligent in its handling of the health crisis and breached its 
duty of care to residents’, emphasising the failure to immediately transport infected 
residents to hospital, the lack of information provided to family about the outbreak, 
and the absence of staff who were qualified or supported to make critical decisions: 
‘The reality is lives would have been saved if Newmarch House had the right 
protocols and medical care procedures in place and adhered to them from the 
start’.169  
Beyond these class actions, law firms are predicting broader litigation against 
RACFs. Indeed, comments attributed to the law firm Norton Rose Fulbright 
reportedly stated that there is a ‘“serious risk” of industry-wide class actions 
against Australia’s aged care sector … which – if brought – would place that sector 
under “enormous financial strain” and give rise to numerous headaches for 
governments, the broader healthcare landscape as well as the general 
community’.170 Jack Pembroke-Birss, partner at Norton Rose Fulbright, has 
suggested that legal action could include negligence claims similar to the two class 
actions discussed above, and ‘claims for false imprisonment for those residents 
who were wrongly told they could not leave the facility under public health orders 
that said nothing of the sort’.171 While these class actions are in a much earlier 
stage than the immigration litigation discussed above, in what follows, we identify 
three significant sets of possibilities and potential limitations with this emerging 
approach. Many of the limitations arise from inherent legal or strategic dimensions 
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of such litigation, yet in light of the dynamics discussed in Parts II and III above, 
these limitations are heightened due to the sociopolitical status of people in 
RACFs.  
A first set of possibilities and potential limitations relates to the structure of 
class actions. Class actions (or ‘group proceeding’172) have many benefits in terms 
of access to justice, and time and cost efficiency for claimants. As noted by 
Murphy and Cameron, there has been judicial acknowledgement that ‘the class 
action mechanism makes it possible to pursue legitimate claims arising from mass 
wrongs that would not be addressed if individuals were left to seek a remedy on 
their own’.173 Bringing together residents with family members and employees in 
the same claim provides collective capacity to bring legal action which might 
otherwise be difficult for individual residents due to access to justice issues. Yet, 
the class action approach might marginalise public recognition of legal 
accountability owed specifically to residents. In both the COVID-19 cases so far, 
the representative plaintiff174 has been a family member of a deceased resident, not 
a surviving resident. Of course, there are many practical and strategic reasons 
behind selection of the representative plaintiff that might explain this choice (eg, 
managing the litigation on behalf of the group on a day-to-day basis). In legal 
terms, the ‘representative party’s claim need not be typical of the group members’ 
claims’ nor do they need to have a similar relationship to the defendant.175 It has 
also been argued that there is no ‘clear theoretical or doctrinal underpinning of the 
representative party’s role’ vis-à-vis group members.176 However, the fact that the 
representative plaintiff is the ‘public face’ of the litigation focuses our attention on 
the situation and suffering of family members rather than residents.177 A family 
member representative plaintiff might have a synecdochical effect of contributing 
to the public perception that the class action is purely for family members (and this 
is certainly the case in the initial media reporting of the class action) and/or filters 
the injustices and harms of the defendants’ negligence through the legally 
documented experiences of family members. Hence, in the RACFs context the 
class action might have reduced utility as a vehicle for public recognition of the 
harms to residents themselves and their status as agential subjects. This is 
concerning, given the loss of autonomy already characterising confinement and 
the use of restrictive practices in RACFs, exacerbated during COVID-19. 
A further concern is that the damages sought tend to focus on individual harms 
and injury undergone rather than on the structural conditions which lead to that 
harm, such as confinement, social isolation and neglect. For instance, the 
requirement in negligence law that mental harm must amount to a psychiatric 
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illness medicalises social/relational loss,178 and only recognises particular 
manifestations of grief.179 Moreover, the legal outcomes sought focus on damages 
for past/concluded wrongful acts, rather than remedial action which might mitigate 
against future harms. This means that litigation alone is unlikely to bring about 
change for the parties or for the residents still in the RACF. The reactive approach 
in the RACF context, in initiating legal proceedings only following high rates of 
death at certain RACFs, might speak to perceived or actual lack of options for 
alternative housing and care for older people within the community, such that it is 
not feasible to bring actions to get people out of RACFs at the present time.180 
However, this reflects a failure of public policy and social imagination, sustaining 
the dynamic of limited ‘choice’ which drives many into RACFs, as noted in Part 
II above. 
Third, defendants in both class actions are RACF providers, rather than 
individual employees or the Commonwealth government. There are obvious 
strategic reasons for this given the RACF provider will presumably have much 
deeper pockets (by reason of their insurance coverage).181 Additionally, pinning 
accountability to RACF providers sends a message of a structural or cultural 
failure in RACF service provision and governance, focusing attention on the 
economic drivers for the negligent conduct. It thus challenges some of the 
underlying dynamics of the collective harms to older/disabled people and people 
with disability in RACFs identified in Parts II and III. However, the loss spreading 
impact of insurance182 might impact on the extent to which RACF accountability 
results in subsequent change in RACF service provision. Any choice to sue the 
RACF provider, as opposed to the Commonwealth government, can diminish the 
accountability of that government for its funding and regulation of aged care 
(unless the aged care providers cross claim or raise the defence of contributory 
negligence). Such a choice can contribute to government complicity in a broader 
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harmful culture and set of practices towards people in RACFs across the aged care 
industry.183  
 
V   TOWARDS A POLITICS OF ABOLITION  
We now turn to consider the legal lessons and analytical connections across 
legal regimes of control and confinement. Both forms of litigation have 
highlighted the particular vulnerabilities of people in IDCs and RACFs, while 
emphasising the power of strategic litigation or class actions to make visible 
ongoing harms and compel possible alternative arrangements to detention and 
confinement. Nonetheless, our analysis also highlights the risk that civil litigation, 
based on duty of care principles, may merely reproduce or legitimate the very 
regimes of confinement that subject people to harm, rather than questioning their 
foundations. We nonetheless suggest that certain legal remedies oriented towards 
deinstitutionalisation and decarceration may challenge the particular logics of 
disposability at work towards elderly citizens and asylum seekers and other 
criminalised non-citizens within sites of confinement. In particular, we point to 
some key areas of future consideration in legal scholarship and advocacy during 
and beyond the pandemic. 
Comparing COVID-19 civil litigation concerning IDCs and RACFs 
illuminates fundamental differences in understandings of confinement as well as 
the legal, practical and political consequences of these understandings for the 
ongoing legitimacy and legal accountability of IDCs and RACFs. As noted above, 
a key distinction between the legal accountability strategies across the two sites of 
confinement was that the legal actions vis-à-vis immigration detention were 
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proactive and sought to prevent ongoing COVID-19-related harms to specific 
people incarcerated in IDCs, while the legal actions vis-à-vis RACFs were largely 
reactive and initiated in the aftermath of numerous people having died in both of 
the two respondents’ facilities. This meant that while the interlocutory orders 
sought against the Commonwealth in relation to immigration detention were 
ultimately directed towards preventing an apprehended breach of duty of care and 
compelling the release of certain people from particular IDCs (even if these have 
been unsuccessful to date), the legal outcomes being sought in the RACF class 
actions are largely compensation for past breaches of RACF providers’ duty of 
care.  
We argue that this distinction arises for two reasons in particular. First, refugee 
advocacy has had a longer tradition and clearer focus on the illegitimacy of 
immigration detention, and a more concentrated advocacy focus on the liberty of 
migrants. In contrast, there is an ambivalence towards deinstitutionalisation in 
aged care advocacy, informed in part by current advocacy funding models,184 a 
perceived lack of alternative care options, and a predominant focus in aged care 
advocacy on improving standards of care within existing RACFs rather than 
advocating for alternatives. Second, there is greater legislative clarity around the 
legal basis for immigration detention, as compared to the dominance of choice and 
necessity as drivers for RACFs, which can mask legal dynamics enabling 
confinement as we outlined above in Part II. While COVID-19 has given rise to 
more vocal calls by advocates and scholars for the deinstitutionalisation of the 
provision of aged care,185 our analysis suggests that there needs to be a more legally 
grounded understanding of certain practices within RACFs as detention, and a 
strategy of engaging law for deinstitutionalisation. Indeed, such a 
reconceptualisation of RACFs within aged care advocacy could draw on the 
strategies, successes, and lessons learned from the immigration detention context 
while also learning from frameworks developed in a prison context such as ‘anti-
carceral remedies’.186 That said, it is important to acknowledge that the recent 
increased use of torts law in immigration advocacy arose in part due to the limited 
successes, in the wake of the Lim decision, in challenging the statutory basis and 
lawfulness of immigration detention.187 
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Another key difference across the two types of COVID-19 litigation has been 
the different positioning of legal subjecthood. While the legal actions around IDCs 
were necessarily initiated on behalf of detained individuals, the plaintiff groups in 
the RACF legal actions are much more expansive, with a primary focus on the 
experiences of family members. On the one hand, this possibly highlights the 
greater status of people in immigration detention as agential subjects, as compared 
to those in aged care. But it can also be to the disadvantage of each group: people 
in IDCs are often constructed as being too agential, or failing to comply with 
government directives to wait in a refugee ‘queue’ compared to people in RACFs 
who in contrast tend to be infantilised in protective confinement, subject to others’ 
decisions to move them there. It is thus important to situate legal subjectivity in a 
broader critique of the construction of political subjectivity. However, our analysis 
shows how the populations in both sites are effectively treated as potentially 
disposable or ungrievable lives. 
Despite these differences, our analysis illuminates some possibilities of civil 
litigation to address underlying structural harms and advance a politics of 
deinstitutionalisation or even abolition. As demonstrated above, negligence as a 
legal action may be limited in its capacity to adequately redress the structural and 
collective harms experienced within IDCs and RACFs. Negligence claims 
necessarily individualise both calculations of risk and determinations of harm. 
Only particular kinds of risks and harm are recognised in law for the purposes of 
interlocutory action or eventual damages. This means, for example, that any 
claimed damages need to be tightly drawn, as individual and as corporeal.188 In the 
COVID-19 immigration litigation, both the applicants had particular co-
morbidities that increased their individual risk of likely harm or even death if they 
contracted COVID-19 and their claimed damages included the corporal 
dimensions of potential ‘deterioration of mental harm’ arising from the use of 
solitary confinement as a COVID-19 measure,189 while the RACFs COVID-19 
litigation similarly stressed the individual experiences of mental harm (including 
depression, anxiety and nervous shock) of family members when hearing of their 
family members’ deaths. When done in the context of a class action (as in the case 
of the aged care litigation), negligence can remedy individual harms experienced 
by a number of people which highlights a wider or mass problem, but cannot 
redress collective or shared community harm (although the possibility for higher 
damages bill for defendants might be an incentive for structural change).190 As a 
result, the interlocutory orders in the immigration litigation were also necessarily 
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individualised. For example, the court order in Plaintiff M37/2020 stipulated only 
for the provision of PPE to the applicant, and for the applicant to be given an 
individual room, rather than covering conditions within IDCs more generally.191 
This means that the structural harms remain unaddressed, particularly in cases that 
settle or are discontinued early, such that they may limit public access to the details 
of the case or inhibit development of the common law or social change more 
broadly.192  
While the impacts of COVID-19 for specific plaintiffs in IDCs and RACFs 
can be deeply personal, corporeal, emotional and familial, on another level, 
COVID-19 responses can have a ‘social as well as an individual dimension’.193 
Indeed, there is potential for some of the underlying harms of the death, injury and 
risk in immigration detention and residential aged care failing even to register as a 
breach of duty of care: after all, the confinement of large numbers of older and 
disabled people in RACFs and of people held in close proximity in IDCs is part of 
the very design of such places and what they are funded to do.194 Negligence might 
not be capable of addressing such manifestations of ‘slow violence’.195 Sites of 
confinement tend to produce forms of injury which are slow and diffused, 
constituting social ‘wounds’ which are nonetheless incapable of being ‘captured 
by our current legal imaginary’.196 On the other hand, establishing a particular 
acceptable legal standard of care for the treatment of people within these spaces 
can also have the indirect effect of legitimating sites of detention and confinement 
per se, that for instance allows the courts to prescribe particular measures intended 
to ‘reform’ or make IDCs ‘safer’ during exceptional health emergencies, and in 
doing so act to legitimate the logic of incarceration at state borders.197 As a 
consequence, negligence litigation and the class action mechanisms may 
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ultimately bolster efforts to ‘better’ regulate IDCs and RACFs, rather than question 
the confinement and institutionalisation of people within these sites. 
Nonetheless, COVID-19 litigation can prompt critical public and legal 
conversations around produced vulnerability, social responsibility and legal 
accountability in these sites. For example, Dayna Nadine Smith, following Sarah 
Jain, has argued that ‘the function of tort law is not only to compensate the injured, 
but to do the political and social work of deciding what will count as injury and to 
make physical injuries material’.198 This allows us to conceive of COVID-19 
litigation as raising fundamental questions about the distribution of political, legal 
and ethical responsibility in society.199 While negligence law does not require 
those responsible for certain harms to think ethically about social relations or to 
question structures that ultimately place people in situations that give rise to 
individual breaches, specific legal remedies and the broader framing of these cases 
could compel public attention to such questions. For example, family members 
involved in the St Basil’s COVID-19 litigation have stressed that the case is much 
more directed towards promoting increased transparency around RACFs than it is 
about individual compensation. In the words of one family member, the case is 
‘the only way of establishing what went wrong’ because, as he stated, ‘[w]e have 
bits and pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, but there’s still a lot of pieces missing’.200 In 
this way, litigation may be able to facilitate ‘cracking open a window and shedding 
light on the utter inhumanity’ of practices of confinement, and, in doing so, expose 
the harms of systemic institutionalisation in sites like RACFs and IDCs.201 This is 
particularly important given the closed nature of these institutional settings, their 
limited visibility and the lack of information provided to family members or the 
public at large during COVID-19.202 
Moreover, when embedded in social movements that call for decarceration, 
strategic litigation can be a useful point of intervention to advance a politics of 
abolition. Debra Parkes has importantly suggested that strategic litigation in a 
prisoner rights context in the United States can challenge the carceral logics of 
systemic mass imprisonment provided that it is embedded in a prison abolitionist 
ethics and social movements, rather than focused on efforts to better regulate or 
reform prisons. For Parkes, this means developing legal arguments ‘in a way that 
rejects carceral logics, rather than legitimizes them’ and seeking non-carceral 
remedies. Otherwise, Parkes argues that 
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 if, for example, we seek only to abolish those smaller cages (solitary 
confinement) but leave intact the logic of caging people in the first place, then 
some other correctional tool or practice will take the place of solitary and we 
will soon be fighting that.203  
Seen in this light, the COVID-19 litigation may not only provide an important 
means of facilitating transparency and access to specific information across both 
sites, but might also advance anti-institutionalisation sentiments or decarceration 
measures, and thereby a broader abolitionist politics. This will particularly be the 
case if the court remedies sought and ordered prompt a collective institutional 
response rather than simply adopt individualised remedies like compelling the 
provision of more PPE to specific people within specific sites of confinement, or 
directing certain detainees or residents to be accommodated in individual rooms 
or subject to self-isolation measures. 
 
VI   CONCLUSION 
We conclude by urging more careful reflection in two respects on the legal, 
political and social responses to IDCs and RACFs beyond the pandemic. First, we 
caution against being so absorbed with the virus that the real crisis recedes from 
view. We argue that it has been the response to the pandemic which has been the 
source of most harm for particular groups in society.204 Notwithstanding that pre-
existing medical conditions might predispose people to greater harm from 
COVID-19 exposure, it is clear that where there are adequate protective measures, 
and where people are able to socially isolate and move in open, well-ventilated 
spaces while maintaining access to social supports, they are less likely to become 
infected and more likely to be able to access appropriate medical care should this 
occur. The emergence of COVID-19 class actions and strategic litigation in the 
context of RACFs and IDCs illustrate this point, with the turn to law seeking to 
redress not harms from the virus per se, but those emerging from institutional 
failures to deliver adequate care during the pandemic. Announcements by the 
federal government for additional funding to address the ‘trauma’ experienced in 
aged care due to the crisis,205 and the re-opening Christmas Island to purportedly 
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deliver greater ‘safety’ than in onshore IDCs, point to this ongoing failure in the 
Australian government’s response, not the risk of the virus.206 Accordingly, we 
argue that COVID-19 is a prism that brings into sharper relief existing inequalities 
including the injustices and inequalities of regimes, sites and practices of 
confinement generally. We thus support calls to ‘never waste a crisis’ and ensure 
‘the structures of inequality are seriously challenged’,207 to see COVID-19 as a 
‘portal, a gateway between one world and the next’,208 and to press for an 
appreciation and transformation of those structures which lead to some groups 
being more exposed to harms (sickness and death) than others. 
Secondly, this is an opportunity, in the words of Anamika Misra, to be 
sufficiently ‘[d]aring to give humanity a different future beyond the pandemic of 
coronavirus and racism [requiring] a radical re-imagining of humanness and the 
ethics of being-human-in-the-world’.209 Such considerations mean that there is an 
urgent need for more critical engagement with how vulnerability is produced as an 
effect of systems of confinement themselves, rather than merely by COVID-19.210 
Our concern is that COVID-19 is ‘overshadowing’ underlying factors which lead 
to greater risk regardless of the pandemic. Positioning the virus as the threat 
eclipses the violence of those legal regimes which, when coupled with COVID-19 
measures, enhance COVID-19 risks and harms for particular groups. 
In conclusion, our analysis has highlighted how some people, already regarded 
as more disposable than others, have been subjected to a heightened logic of 
disposability as an effect of COVID-19 measures, in which the economic value 
and cost of preserving life appears to be the overarching metrics.211 Nonetheless, 
legal responses challenging such calculations are also gathering momentum to 
offer a limited form of legal accountability. Our analysis of these litigations points 
to broader challenges and opportunities facing lawyers and legal scholars 
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emerging from COVID-19 in terms of how harms of confinement are articulated 
and contested, and how law can be further engaged to shift from a focus on care 
(or even survival) within these places to a focus on flourishing beyond them. 
Considering such civil litigation concerning IDCs and RACFs in relation to a 
politics of abolition and deincarceration then is an invitation to explore what a 
society based on political inclusion and the building of more just communities 
might look like. 
	
